CURING THE TRIBAL DISENROLLMENT EPIDEMIC: IN SEARCH OF A REMEDY

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This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of tribal membership, and the divestment thereof—commonly known as “disenrollment.” Chiefly caused by the proliferation of Indian gaming revenue distributions to tribal members over the last 25 years, the rate of tribal disenrollment has spiked to epidemic proportions. There is not an adequate remedy to stem the crisis or redress related Indian civil rights violations. This Article attempts to fill that gap. In Part I, we detail the origins of tribal membership, concluding that the present practice of disenrollment is, for the most part, a relic of the federal government’s Indian assimilation and termination policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Part II, we use empirical disenrollment case studies over the last 100 years to show those federal policies at work during that span, and thus how disenrollment operates in ways that are antithetical to tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Those case studies highlight the close correlation between federally prescribed distributions of tribal governmental assets and monies to tribal members on a per-capita basis, and tribal governmental mass disenrollment of tribal members. In Part III, we set forth various proposed solutions to curing the tribal disenrollment epidemic, in hope of spurring discussion and policymaking about potential remedies at the various levels of federal and tribal government. Our goal is to find a cure, before it is too late.

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INTRODUCTION

A. Overview

As sovereign nations with the right to “make their own laws and be ruled by them,” tribal governments are free to define conditions of tribal membership. “Disenrollment”—a term not known to exist in any traditional American Indian language—is the other side of that coin; it is the divestment of tribal membership by a tribe after the “absolute right” of membership is conferred upon a person.

Chiefly caused by the proliferation of Indian gaming revenue distributions to tribal members over the last 25 years, disenrollment is rapidly expanding...
throughout Indian country. Tribal disenrollment is now of epidemic proportion. And despite the evolution of tribal and federal Indian law and international human rights in the United States, there is not yet a remedy to stem the crisis.

There is also a dearth of common law and legal scholarship on the topic of tribal disenrollment. Given the insular nature of tribal governments and the statutorily confidential nature of disenrollment proceedings, many tribal disenrollment controversies go unnoticed by the American public—if not the greater

6. David Wilkins, Two Possible Paths Forward for Native Disenrollees and the Federal Government?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jun. 4, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/06/04/two-possible-paths-forward-native-disenrollees-and-federal-government; see also generally Cedric Sunray, Disenrollment Clubs, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 14, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/disenrollment-clubs-58494. It is estimated that "more than 60 tribes . . . have disenrolled their tribal members in the last 20 years," and "there exists a significantly larger number who have done so outside of the watchful eye of news reporters." Cedric Sunray, Tribes Abandon Traditional Aspects of Inclusion, INDIANZ (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.indianz.com/News/2014/015388.asp. And not only are more and more tribal governments terminating their own, but tribes are jettisoning larger and larger swaths of tribal members—hundreds to thousands at a time. See, e.g., John Ellis & Marc Benjamin, Chukchansi Casino Brings Cash and Turmoil to Once Impoverished Tribe, FRESNO BEE (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/10/18/4186204_casino-has-brought-cash-and-turmoil.html?rh=1 ("As the tribe shrank from its peak of 1,800 to about 900 today, disenrollment became a weapon to get rid of political opponents."); see also Cornwell, supra note 5 (describing the disenrollment of 306 Nooksack Indians as "the largest tribal disenrollment in Washington history").

7. Gosia Wozniacka, Natives Fight Disenrollment Effort: Tribes Have Kicked Out Thousands in Recent Years, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 21, 2014, at B11 (noting that disenrollment has recently reached epidemic proportion in the United States) (quoting Professor David Wilkins).


10. See RENYA K. RAMIREZ, NATIVE HUBS: CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND BELONGING IN SILICON VALLEY AND BEYOND 165 (2007) ("[S]ome Native Americans may be angry that I am writing about disenrollment, contending that I am ‘airing’ our community's 'dirty laundry.' There is strong pressure in Native American communities to keep our problems secret from outsiders . . . . "). As discussed in more detail below, where there are some scholars on the fringe who address the topic, many are not Indian law scholars, and of those who are many simply canvass the law on subject as is, rather than seek to determine its origin, effects, and solutions.

tribal public as well. 12 Those seeking legal relief from disenrollment efforts normally must turn to tribal courts, 13 which may not provide published trial court or appellate decisions. 14 Meanwhile, the greater American-Indian academic community has largely and inexplicably ignored the topic. 15 This has resulted in very little legal scholarship or other notable secondary authority on disenrollment. 16 And what disenrollment legal scholarship exists largely fails to address actual disenrollment litigation. 17

This Article attempts to fill the gap between scholarly conjecture about tribal membership rights and remedies, and on-the-ground disenrollment controversy and litigation. It seeks to provide, in other words, grounded and empirical scholarship that will help to inform lawmakers and jurists about the realities of disenrollment. 18 In Part I, we detail the origins of tribal “membership,”

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12. Sunray, supra note 6 (“ Sovereignty has become a smokescreen for illegitimate behavior, racism, nepotism, and narcissism.”).

13. This is for jurisdictional reasons, discussed infra notes 493–501 and accompanying text.

14. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellants, Jefferedo v. Macarro, No. 08-55037, 2008 WL 4205354 (9th Cir. Jul. 30, 2008) (“The Pechanga Tribe has no tribal court. Indeed, this absence of a tribal court is at the core of the Enrollment Committee’s ability to blatantly violate Appellants due process rights.”); see also generally Bonnie Shucha, “ Whatever Tribal Precedent There May Be”: The (Un)availability of Tribal Law, 106 L. Litt. J. 199, 200 (2014) (discussing the unavailability of published tribal court decisions). The National Native American Bar Association has recently issued a Resolution stating that “the American indigenous right of tribal citizenship is sacrosanct; at tribal common law, the right, once vested, is recognized as an ‘absolute right,’” denouncing “any divestment or restriction of the American indigenous right of tribal citizenship, without equal protection at law or due process of law or an effective remedy for the violation of such rights,” and declaring “that it is immoral and unethical for any lawyer to advocate for or contribute to the divestment or restriction of the American indigenous right of tribal citizenship, without equal protection at law or due process of law or an effective remedy for the violation of such rights.” NAT’L NATIVE AM. B. ASS’N, RESOLUTION # 2015-06, Apr. 8, 2015, available at http://www.nativeamericanbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2015-04-09-2015-06-NNABA-Resolution-Due-Process.pdf.

15. See David Wilkins, Thoughts on How We Re-Member, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jul. 30, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/07/30/how-do-we-re-member (“There are no easy answers but I believe academia deserves as much of the blame as anyone for not facing this reality and attacking it head on.”); see also Galanda, supra note 3 (discussing “the dearth of teachings about disenrollment from today’s Indian academic establishment.”).


18. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, American Indian Legal Scholarship and the Courts: Heeding Frickey’s Call, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 1, 2 (2013); Phillip Parker, Reconciling
concluding that, at least in its modern form, the idea is not one inherent or innate to American Indians. The present practice of tribal disenrollment is, for the most part, a relic of the federal government’s Indian assimilation and termination policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Disenrollment policy has become so engrained in the federal–tribal relationship that many tribal governments believe that the federally imposed idea of “disenrollment” was implemented on their own accord. In reality, however, disenrollment is a nonindigenous construct and a power that has been delegated by the United States to tribes over time.

In Part II, we use case studies to argue that disenrollment accomplishes nothing to advance tribal sovereignty or self-determination. Indeed, when tribal governments disenroll their own people, at least in the current and most common manner, they are perpetuating the federal assimilationist and terminationist policies of the early twentieth century—policies that the federal government long ago abandoned (at least ostensibly), and that tribal governments have always rebuked. Disenrollment erodes tribal existence as we know it by: (1) perpetuating federal policies that mandate an arbitrary, aberrant, and forced biological division between Indians and non-Indians, to the detriment of the former; (2) assimilating American Indians into mainstream society, resulting in the loss of the tribal land base and related Indian cultural identity; (3) promoting wholesale termination of the federal–tribal relationship; (4) encouraging a lack of redress to Indians aggrieved by tribal leaders; (5) creating intratribal fractionalization; (6) triggering Indian-on-Indian violence; and (7) disregarding the federal fiduciary duty to all American Indians.

20. See Kelly M. Branam, Book Review, Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity Joanne Barker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 35 PolAR: Pol. & Legal Anthropology Rev. 354, 355 (2012) (“[T]ribal councils defend their disenrollment practices using arguments invoking sovereignty and a desire to preserve their culture.”); Galanda, supra note 3 (“[T]oday disenrollment is being taught to Indian Country as if the practice belongs, and has always belonged, to American indigenous peoples. . . . [C]olonialist teachings of Indian exclusion and assimilation are espoused, and believed, accomplishing disenrollment—and completing the modern circle of Indian self-termination.”).
21. See generally infra Parts I.C & I.E. In this way, we pick up in the footsteps of Joanne Barker, who argues that federal “enrollment policies . . . were instituted within allotment agreements . . . [and] then carried into tribal constitutions established under the terms of the Indian Reorganization Act” and that under these policies tribal members “are only recognized as Native within the legal terms and social conditions of racialized discourses that serve the national interests of the United States in maintaining colonial and imperial relations with Native peoples.” Joanne Barker, Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity 4–6 (2011).
Thus, when weighed against the alternative that is tribal self-determination, disenrollment is antithetical to tribal sovereignty—it is a concept forced upon tribal societies to diminish the exercise of tribal self-governance; and it has, since the federal advent of Indian rolls and mechanisms for removal therefrom, been accomplishing just that. We also observe the close correlation between federally prescribed distributions of tribal governmental assets and monies to tribal members on a per-capita basis, and tribal governmental mass disenrollment of tribal members, dating back to the early twentieth century.

In Part III, we propose various solutions to redress the problems associated with tribal disenrollment. Because the federal government has created and advanced the tribal disenrollment paradigm without affording remedies to aggrieved American Indian disenrollees, and because tribal governments have carried out federally delegated disenrollment powers in breach of their own peoples’ human and civil rights, we hope that the proposed solutions will spur discussion and policymaking about reform, particularly at the various levels of federal and tribal government.

Ultimately, it is tribal governments that are responsible for today’s disenrollment epidemic. It is tribal peoples who must help find the cure, and it is the federal government that has a trust obligation to help them do so. The fact that the United States has imposed unscrupulous laws and policies upon American Indian people for the sake of conquering them is nothing new. Nor is it new that tribal governments have adopted and imposed those laws of the conqueror, as if they represent the tribes’ own norms. Yet what is new, or at least modern, is the real ability for tribal governments and societies to rebuke those colonial-turned-federal laws and return to the customs, traditions, and norms that have allowed American Indians to survive into the present era. Tribal peoples must do so, and the cure to the disenrollment epidemic must be found, before it is too late.

B. Background

It is crucial to understand that a tribal government’s ability to determine, define, and limit the criteria for tribal membership,23 is distinct from its ability to retract a previous determination that an individual has satisfied existing criteria for tribal membership.24 While the former is properly defined as an aspect of inherent tribal sovereignty, the latter—disenrollment—is not. Disenrollment is entirely a


construct of federal law, not of American indigenous norms. Thus, in regard to federal Indian notions of tribal “membership” or “enrollment,” those concepts are distinguishable, and must be distinguished, from normative American indigenous tenets of tribal “belonging,” “kinship,” or “citizenship.” As it stands, however, these concepts are conflated and such critical distinction is lost in the federal-tribal lexicon. In the end, tribes must move past federally imposed notions of tribal “membership” and “enrollment.” The mere fact that tribal governments have been delegated federal authority to determine these matters does not mean that they must accept them as normative. As sovereigns, tribes set limits on citizenship, and as indigenous peoples, tribes should base these limits on norms of indigenous belonging and kinship. Indeed, indigenous persons enjoy an inherent “right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned”—not the imposed concepts of the conqueror.

Yet even defined under the colonial rubric, tribal membership is sacrosanct. As explained by the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Court of Appeals:

Tribal membership for Indian people is more than mere citizenship in an Indian tribe. It is the essence of one’s identity, belonging to community, connection to one’s heritage and an affirmation of their human being place in this life and world. In short, it is not an overstatement to say that it is everything. In fact, it would be an understatement to say anything less. Tribal membership completes the circle for the member’s physical, mental, emotional and spiritual aspects of human life.

To forcibly disenroll an American indigenous person, in other words, is to destroy their identity—their everything. Disenrolled persons lose not only their indigenous identity, but they may also be practically forced to vacate their ancestral

25. See COHEN, supra note 20, at § 3.03 (“[F]ederal law has constrained and molded tribal membership provisions.”), Nicole J. Laughlin, Identity Crisis: An Examination of Federal Infringement on Tribal Autonomy to Determine Membership, 30 Hamline L. Rev. 97, 99 (2007) (noting that “[a]lthough the federal government recognizes the right of tribes to make this determination, Congress retains the power to supersede that authority when it deems necessary” and that “[t]hrough federal legislation such as the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Indian Reorganization Act, and the Indian Gaming Act, coupled with regulations imposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, over time the federal government has influenced what it means to be a tribal member.”).

26. See, e.g., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 219 (2011) (using the terms “citizenship” and “membership” interchangeably).


29. Ryan Seelau, Disenrollment Demands Serious Attention by All Sovereign Nations, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 10, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/12/10/disenrollment-demands-serious-attention-all-sovereign-nations (“[D]isenrollment may be the ultimate coercive act a government can take against an individual.”).
lands and are otherwise alienated from their indigenous community.\textsuperscript{30} In the most egregious instances, tribal elders, who have spent their entire lives self-identifying as tribal members and learning and teaching indigenous cultural traditions, are summarily jettisoned from their tribal communities because of some alleged “error” in either their own or their ancestors’\textsuperscript{31} enrollment files.\textsuperscript{32} Needless to say, disenrollment—the loss of “the most important civil right” of American Indians—causes extreme and irreparable legal harm and personal pain and heartache.\textsuperscript{33}

Under the constructs and restraints of federal law, tribal membership is “the foundation for individual rights within a tribe—a necessary prerequisite from which all tribal rights and benefits flow.”\textsuperscript{34} Disenrollment deprives an affected person of


\textsuperscript{32} Diamond, supra note 30.


\textsuperscript{34} Brendan Ludwick, \textit{The Scope of Federal Authority Over Tribal Membership Disputes and the Problem of Disenrollment}, \textit{51 FED. LAW.} 37, 37 (2004). An explanation of the benefits of tribal membership is included in Cohen’s Handbook as follows: [C]haracterization of an individual as an “Indian” has a wide range of consequences under federal law, including being subject to federal or tribal rather than state criminal jurisdiction; eligibility for federal benefits and employment preferences; exemption from state taxation, child
various rights guaranteed by the federal government in fulfillment of treaty and other federal legal obligations, such as rights to hunt, fish, gather, and worship on aboriginal lands; to own and occupy real property under federal stewardship and protection; and to receive healthcare, education, and housing.\(^{35}\) Still, tribal membership is far more than the sum of its legal parts—it is “a sacred state of being and belonging, understood only by those who are akin to it”\(^{36}\); it is being a “part of a group whose roots go back to pre-historic times, and that has carried forward its language, customs, and belief systems to the present day, despite terrible travails.”\(^{37}\) In other words, tribal membership is “an individual’s most basic and important legal affiliation”—“an inviolable right.”\(^{38}\) Such a legal right, when violated, deserves a remedy.

Regrettably, there is generally no domestic forum to have tribal membership right violations or disenrollment abuses remedied.\(^{39}\) Since the 1940s, there has been an international movement away from using nation–state sovereignty as a shield against redress and toward an understanding that governments must be held legally accountable for the illegal or inhumane treatment of their citizens.\(^{40}\) But tribal governments have not witnessed this change. As Professor Wenona Singel explains, the “dramatic changes” that sovereignty underwent in the international arena “were never translated to the Indian law context” and, “[a]s a result, tribal sovereignty has remained caught in a time warp, frozen in the form it took when the Supreme Court began to articulate the tribal sovereignty doctrine in the nineteenth century.”\(^{41}\)

While “federal Indian law,” particularly at common law, sets the outer contours of tribal sovereignty, that law is primarily used to define the relationship between the federal government and tribal governments, and between tribes, state welfare, and other civil authority; participation in distributions of proceeds from tribal economic development, such as gaming; and entitlement to inherit certain trust or restricted lands.

See Cohen, supra note 20 at § 3.03[1].

35. See, e.g., Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing benefits lost when a member is disenrolled).


39. As discussed infra notes 450–78 and accompanying text, although independent tribal judiciaries do provide a great domestic forum, they are often not a viable option because they either do not exist or do not provide de novo review of a tribal council’s decision to disenroll.


41. Id.
governments, and non-Indians. Federal Indian law, therefore, has not yet enveloped human rights law vis-à-vis tribal sovereignty. This domestic human rights vacuum supports Vine Deloria Jr.’s forecast that tribal sovereignty has “lost its political moorings” and is thus “adrift on the currents of individual fancy.” Tribal governments have faced similar criticism from the federal judiciary, Congress, and indigenous law scholars, for using their sovereignty in a manner that is “anachronistic and an affront to human rights.” Domestic violations of human rights vis-à-vis disenrollment now demand a remedy.

I. ORIGINS OF TRIBAL “MEMBERSHIP”

“Tribal membership is the foundation of tribal political rights.” When modern tribal governments set membership criteria, they are certainly exercising their sovereign authority to, for example, preserve tribal resources—similar to what most countries do when setting nationalization and citizenship criteria. It

42. Id.
47. Singel, supra note 40, at 618.
50. Ryan W. Schmidt, American Indian identity and Blood Quantum in the 21st Century: A Critical Review, 2011 J. ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 7 (“[T]ribes need to control population growth to apportion the benefits of gaming to deserving tribal members and sustain reservation economic development.”). The Pechanga Band of Luiseno Indians, for example, saw an increase from approximately 15–30 membership enrollment requests per year prior to gaming, to more than 450 after the Tribe opened its lucrative casino. Danna Harman, Gambling on Tribal Ancestry, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 2004, at 15.
bears repeating that when tribal governments disenroll their people, however, they are exercising a nonindigenous concept that has been developed by the federal government, and delegated to tribes in an effort to “wipe out Indian culture, traditions, and ways of life.” 52 Indeed, disenrollment is an invented aspect of “sovereignty” that the U.S. government itself does not even possess. 53 In this Part, we provide positive proof for this assertion.

A. Post-Contact and Pre-Constitutional Development (1492–1789)

Generally, “Native Americans relied on the concept of kinship for purposes of identity.” 54 As noted by Professor Raymond J. DeMallie:

Membership in bands was by choice; by residing in a particular band, individuals could decide to count themselves as members of it. Children were considered to belong to the band of the father or mother, but residence, rather than descent, seems to have been the operative category. Each band was governed by a council of adult males who had achieved prominence in warfare . . . . [W]hen various bands congregated during the summer, their councils combined into one and recognized a variety of tribal leaders which in a sense acted as the symbolic fathers of the camp, putting aside individual and band interests for those of the tribe at large. 55

Professor Raymond D. Fogelson, has also noted:

Kinship not only included those with whom one could trace familiar common descent, but could be extended to include more ramifying groups like clans, moieties, and even nations. Moreover, besides biological reproduction, individuals and groups could be recruited into kinship networks through naturalization, adoption, marriage, and alliance. Identity encompassed inner qualities that were made manifest through social action and cultural belief. 56

Similar to the citizenship rules implemented by the United States and most other countries today, 57 the right of belonging or kinship has historically been permanent

53. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment, government had no power to rob a citizen of his citizenship as “the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to . . . protect every citizen against congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.”).
54. Laughlin, supra note 25, at 101.
and could not be lost involuntarily. The exception to this rule was “banishment,” a punitive sentence under which an indigenous person was sent out of his or her community, and forced to live away from the community for a prescribed period of time. In most American indigenous societies, individuals were held accountable for their transgressions by being forced to restore stability and harmony within the family and tribal community by compensation and seeking forgiveness. An individual’s delinquent behavior was thus of concern to both his or her own family, as well as the local community. An individual’s kin would impose an initial reprimand; the community could impose further sanctions, and might also admonish the kin if the original discipline was not appropriate. Banishment of the individual was only considered as a last resort, if familial and community penal efforts failed, and reserved for serious crimes, such as murder or incest. In order to effect banishment as a punishment, a consensus of the community was generally required; such consensus was most often established through the presentation of oral testimony about an individual’s character and wrongdoing to a tribal governing body, if not the entire community. Yet given

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58. E.g., *Afroyim*, 387 U.S. at 253; *Vance v. Terrazas*, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980); see also *Perez v. Brownell*, 356 U.S. 44, 78 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled by, *Afroyim*, 387 U.S. at 268 (“[T]his priceless right [U.S. citizenship] is immune from the exercise of governmental powers.”); Berger & Fisher, supra note 30, at 66 (“Membership cannot be a political decision. Tribal communities must be able to rely on decisions made by past tribal councils. Without consistency in the law, there can be only chaos and . . . injustice.”); Eric Reitman, *An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power Over Membership*, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 841 (2006) (“Membership is a minimum set of rights, but it cannot be the null set. Where everything an individual gains from an association can be instantly and summarily withdrawn, the community is a failure, and a drag both on the resources of the membership and on those who bear the externalities imposed by a defunct polity.”); see also *Seelau*, supra note 29 (“[D]isenrollment should have extremely high procedural safeguards and strong systems of governance to uphold those protections . . . . One source of inspiration for such protections might be the United States, where the safeguards are nearly absolute and in favor of an individual citizen’s right to remain a citizen.”).

59. Wozniacka, supra note 7 (quoting Professor Wilkins).


62. Id.

63. Id.

64. Id. at 93.


66. Id.
indigenous notions of belonging, even a banished person was typically allowed to return to the community conditionally after serving his or her time away.67

As opposed to belonging- or kinship-based notions of citizenship, the European colonizers of today’s United States generally defined the status of American Indian persons by bloodline.68 Degrees or percentages of “Indian blood” became the definitional standard for American Indians.69 Such was articulated in terms of “the number of generations from an unmixed Indian ancestor,” especially because that is how the early colonies limited American Indians’ rights; for example, “unmixed” American Indians were ineligible to testify in court proceedings or marry Euro-Americans.70 It was also held that those of mixed descent might serve as a “civilizing’ force.”71 “Mixed bloods” were thus defined in a category of their own, because it was thought that they would more rapidly assimilate into what would become American society.72

Notions of indigenous persons’ “mixed blood” eventually became matters of their “blood quantum,”73 all by the colonial advent74 of a policy to further divide and negate American Indians.75 Under such a policy, American Indians were deemed biologically inferior and required segregation (or sometimes

67. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 28–29 (Bruce Elliott Johansen ed., 1998); see also Jessica Metoui, Returning to the Circle: The Reemergence of Traditional Dispute Resolution in Native American Communities, 2007 J. Disp. Resol. 517, 538 (“Banishment functions as rehabilitation for the offender who . . . is required to remain apart from society for a prescribed period of time and must build great self sufficiency in order to survive.”).


69. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2006). One of the earliest examples is a 1705 Virginia statute defining a “mulatto” as “the child of an Indian and child, grandchild or great grandchild of a negro” and barring such a person from holding public office. Id.

70. Id.

71. Id.


73. The term “blood quantum” is defined as “the relative amount of ancestry one can trace back to one specific tribe.” Lorinda Riley, Shifting Foundation: The Problem with Inconsistent Implementation of Federal Recognition Regulations, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 629, 669 n.123 (2013). As Sarah Krakoff has noted, while the term has become naturalized in recent years, it is necessarily a racialized term. Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1132 n.77 (2012) (citing ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008); Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006)).


75. Cornel Pewewardy, To Be or Not to Be Indigenous: Identity, Race, and Representation in Education, 4 INDIGENOUS NATIONS STUD. J. 69, 87 (2003).
extermination). As discussed below, the perpetuation of blood-quantum notions has only served to extend this Eurocentric philosophy, by subjugating American Indian notions of belonging and kinship, and replacing those indigenous norms with racialized criteria that serve “federal objectives for Native government dissolution and land dispossession.” And despite efforts to purge these policies from modern federal policy, these underpinnings remain as a central tenet of federal Indian law—and in turn have become part and parcel of tribal law too.

B. The Formative Years (1789–1871)

In fulfillment of Manifest Destiny, the colonial period was rife with land-hungry settlers and spectators. As those persons encroached upon American Indians’ aboriginal lands, violent skirmishes erupted between colonizers and settlers and American indigenous peoples. After the revolutionary war, the new American nation was thought to be too weak to enforce its sovereignty over American Indians, so it instead employed a system of peace negotiation and treaty making, under compulsory tenets of international law. At this time the federal government took an active interest in defining who exactly was an “Indian,” primarily to determine a tribe’s “chief” for the sake of legitimizing the transfer of lands to colonizers and settlers by treaty. It was under that circumstance that the federal government first began to regulate ethnicity and determine the criterion for tribal

77. BARKER, supra note 22, at 93–94.
78. If relied upon alone, tribes would be gone in several generations because of intermarriage issues, which was likely purposeful. See generally Duane Champange, Are Ethnic Indians a Threat to Indigenous Rights?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 27, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/12/27/are-ethnic-indians-threat-indigenous-rights-158308.
80. See generally Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (2008).
82. See Scott Richard Lyons, Rhetorical Sovereignty, 51 C. COMPOSITION & COMM., 447, 451 (2000) (“European states were compelled to recognize and engage Indian nations as political actors in their diplomatic activities. They did this in a large part through making treaties . . . .” (citation and internal quotation omitted)).
84. Id. While some treaties were entered into fraudulently, with groups whose authority to act on behalf of the relevant tribe was highly questionable, others were entered into for the purpose of ceasing hostilities between several warring tribes and other western states and otherwise providing protection. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 170–80 (1994).
enrollment—a right it would actively exercise until the turn of the twenty-first century, and not shirk until circa 2009, as discussed below.

The federal government, however, was not especially concerned about the accuracy of any tribal-membership edict because it was then thought that Indian identity would soon disappear. As such, there was little point in keeping accurate track of tribal members. In fact, the notion of determining who was and was not an Indian—as opposed to who was a tribal chief with treatymaking authority—was so relatively unimportant in settlement of land transfers, that it was relegated to that of nascent state law, rather than federal law.

By 1828, the year that Andrew Jackson became a presidential candidate, the topic of transferring Indian land to non-Indians had become a national hot topic. Jackson’s favor for Indian removal was well known. Thus, one of Jackson’s top priorities after his election was to legislate a federal priority of Indian removal and land exchange. In 1830, Congress passed the Removal Act to relocate all Indians to west of the Mississippi River.

During the ensuing Indian removal period, wherein American Indians were removed onto “reservations,” the federal government began using Indian bloodlines as the “principal tool of genocidal extermination.” Federal officials began to identify individual Indians by blood in specific amounts, such as “one-fourth Indian,” three-fourths ‘white,’ ‘full-blooded,’ or by the general term ‘half-breed.’

In turn, as the U.S. government consummated cession treaties with American Indians, federal treaty negotiators imported notions of Indian blood quantum in

85. Castle, supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. In Ohio, for instance, the question of who was an Indian was determined at state law by “preponderance of blood.” See Doe ex dem. Lafontaine v. Avaline, 8 Ind. 6, 14 (1856) (“Persons of Indian . . . extraction, who have a preponderance of white blood, are declared to be ‘free white citizens,’ within the meaning of the constitution and laws of Ohio.”) (internal citations omitted). In Tennessee and Indiana, status was determined by “habits and quo animo of the party,” i.e., whether one personally identified as an Indian and was regarded as one, regardless of his or her race or blood. Id. (citing Tuten’s Lessee v. Martin, 11 Tenn. 452, 452 (1832)).
88. Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians 21 (1972).
89. Id.; Prucha, supra note 84, at 446–85.
90. Foreman, supra note 88, at 21–22.
93. Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 713, 715 (1986). At the time, it was thought that Indian “half-breeds”—with heightened cognitive ability bestowed by their Caucasian blood—were causing trouble by encouraging resistance to removal and needed to be identified and weeded out from those full-bloods who cold be easier controlled. Spruhan, supra note 69, at 9–11.
94. Id. at 10.
those accords. Treaty references to Indian blood or blood quantum did not typically go so far as to define tribal membership—at that time, “membership” still remained wholly incompatible with American Indian notions of belonging and kinship. These references did, however, “set an important pattern for later federal uses of blood quantum.”

Treaty making persisted as the principal method of dealing with tribal governments until 1871, when Congress terminated the process, instead granting the authority to govern Indian affairs to itself, via legislation. Still, the seeds of blood quantum-based tribal membership requirements had been planted, through the sowing of Indian treaties—the supreme law of the land.

C. Allotment and Assimilation (1871–1928)

Following the Civil War, theories of “civilizing” Indians gained prominence. Proponents of this policy maintained that if Indians “adopted the habits of a civilized life,” they would not need large swaths of land, which would make land available to white settlers. In addition, the lands to which American Indians had been removed also became objects of non-Indian avarice, as valuable minerals had been discovered in several of these territories. To advance Indian assimilation and civilization, Congress passed the General Allotment Act

95. Id. at 11.
96. Id. at 11 n.74.
97. Id. at 11; but see id. at 12 (“The United States does acknowledge mixed-bloods explicitly as tribal members in a few treaties. Treaties with the Chippewa, Omaha, Pawnee, Ponca, and Winnebago each contain provisions recognizing mixed-bloods as tribal members.” (citations omitted)).
99. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886); see also, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 618 (1870) (holding that a “treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress and an act of Congress may supersede a treaty”); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
100. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
102. Id. In 1868, the U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs thus posed the following question: “How can the Indian problem be solved so as best to protect and secure the rights of the Indians, and at the same time promote the highest interests of both races?” Roland W. Force & Maryanne T. Force, The American Indians 123 (1991) (internal quotation omitted). The answer required “a radical reversal of thinking . . . : if you [could] no longer push Indians westward to avoid contact with civilization, and it [was] inhumane to conduct wars of extermination against them, the only alternative [was] to assimilate them.” Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 8 (1983).
“GAA”),105 in 1887. Termed “the most important period in the evolution of tribal enrollment,”106 the GAA divided large reservation-land tracts into much smaller parcels of land, and deeded those parcels to Indian individuals in trust for a period of 25 years.107 The purpose of the GAA was to convert individual Indians into farmers.108 Indians who resisted or refused to accept allotments were imprisoned.109

More generally, supporters of the GAA hoped it would cause mass tribal assimilation into the newly dominant non-Indian society.110 In 1896, Congress created enrollment commissions to compile rolls that codified each tribe’s citizenry.111 Legislation instructed the commissions to: (1) determine the membership status “of all persons who may apply . . . for citizenship” in any of the allotted tribal lands112 in respect to “blood quantum”,113 (2) “respect all laws of the several nations or tribes, not inconsistent with the laws of the United States, and . . . give due force and effect to the rolls, usages, and customs of each of said nations or tribes”; and (3) administer oaths, issue process and compel witnesses, and to collect evidence “for the purpose of determining the rights of persons claiming [tribal] citizenship [and] to protect [tribal] nations from fraud or wrong.”114 Congress gave the commission only six months to issue a “complete roll of citizenship” for all known tribes; these rolls were then deemed complete and final for the purpose of determining who would receive a parcel.115

110. The Bureau of Indian Affairs assumed the function of improving Indians’ “educational interests and sanitary condition” under its “Civilization Division.” WEBSTER ELMES, THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AT WASHINGTON 450–52 (1879).
112. Id. at 339.
113. See Rose Cuisen Villazor, Reading Between the (Blood) Lines, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 473, 480 (2010) (“Individual allotment depended on tribal membership, which in turn relied on an enrollment process that, from the beginning, aimed to distinguish those Indians with ‘true’ Indian blood (‘Indian by blood’) from those Indians with [other] ancestry . . . .”).
115. Id. at 339–40. The statute did give aggrieved individuals who had been omitted from a final roll six months to appeal the omission to the local U.S. District Court. After the six-month statute of limitations ran, the rolls would be deemed final. Id. at 339.
Critically, the tribes themselves did not compile the rolls. Thus, the federal government’s “official” tribal membership rolls were littered with mistakes (e.g., incorrect individuals’ names and tribal affiliations, whole cloth exclusions of absent individuals, and visitor inclusion). Thus, the federal government’s “official” tribal membership rolls were littered with mistakes (e.g., incorrect individuals’ names and tribal affiliations, whole cloth exclusions of absent individuals, and visitor inclusion).116 In addition, and as described in more detail below, many American Indians “resisted enrollment and hid[.] from the enrollment parties because [they] did not believe that the tribal land base should be broken up.”117 The impact of these omissions intensified with each successive generation118 because eventually the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) would generally require that persons of tribal ancestry trace their lineage to a GAA roll.119 In 1899, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to have the final say on tribal membership rolls.120

Blood quantum became a determinative factor for arbitrarily cancelling the trust status of Indian allotment lands. In 1906, Congress passed the Burke Act,121 which in conjunction with the GAA, instituted a system for canceling individual Indians’ trust allotments through the issuance of “fee patents”122 to tribal members who had become “competent and capable of managing his or her affairs”123 through “education and civilization.”124 Blood quantum served as the seminal factor in determining whether a patent should be issued,125 even though the GAA rolls did not always list the blood quantum of the individual, “and if they did, did not necessarily do so accurately.”126

118. Id.
119. Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 955 (10th Cir. 1999).
122. A “fee patent” is a patent for an estate in fee simple; distinguished from a “trust patent,” which refers to land held in trust by the United States for an Indian tribe or land owned by an Indian or Indian tribe and subject to restrictions against alienation. 25 U.S.C. § 1703(9)(A)–(B). Title 25 U.S.C. 349 provided that the U.S. government can issue a fee patent to an Indian whenever it “determines that the Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his own affairs.” Bacher v. Patencio, 232 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D. Cal. 1964), aff’d, 368 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1966).
125. See generally John P. LaVelle, The General Allotment Act “Eligibility Hoax”: Distortions of Law, Policy, and History in Derogation of Indian Tribes, 14 Wicazo Sa Rev. 251 (1999).
In all, the U.S. government’s allotment regime forced American Indians to part with 90 million acres of land over a 50-year period.\textsuperscript{127} A large portion of the Indian population was landless, and many reservations were suddenly crowded with non-Indians.\textsuperscript{128} Although federal allotment policy was later repudiated by Congress, the federal government’s legacy of tribal land allotment and dispossession, and Indian assimilation, still lives on through disenrollment.\textsuperscript{129}

The imposition of blood-quantum rules was also destructive to tribal survival in general. Whereas community belonging focused on having close ties and relationships, the idea of blood quantum, conversely, tied membership to the vaguest genealogical roots possible.\textsuperscript{130} Just as blood quantum was used to divest land and resources from tribes and tribal members, the introduction of blood quantum encouraged tribal members to view membership as a restricted resource, like land, minerals, and money, rather than as a political status.\textsuperscript{131} Blood quantum, in other words, encouraged venal exclusion instead of traditional inclusion.\textsuperscript{132}

\textit{D. Indian Reorganization (1928–1942)}

In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”).\textsuperscript{133} Although the goal of the IRA was “to encourage . . . self-determination, cultural pluralism, and the revival of tribalism,” the federal government continued to actively frame tribal membership rules.\textsuperscript{134} Based on federal notions of governance, rather than American indigenous norms,\textsuperscript{135} the IRA mandated that only descendants of persons residing on a reservation in 1934 and persons “of one-half or more Indian Blood” were entitled to tribal membership.\textsuperscript{136} The federal government’s intent was to limit membership “to persons who reasonably can be expected to participate in tribal relations and affairs,”\textsuperscript{137} which was assumed to be those persons of “ancestral or blood” relation to other members.\textsuperscript{138}

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\textsuperscript{127} Auth. of the Sec’y of the Interior to Restore Lands in San Carlos Mineral Strip to Tribal Ownership, 69 INTERIOR DEC. 195, 198 (Nov. 28, 1962).
\textsuperscript{128} Id.
\textsuperscript{129} See Barker, supra note 22, at 4 (2011) (“While originating in federal policy, blood degree criteria were folded into tribal governance and enrollment policies.”).
\textsuperscript{130} Miller, supra note 74, at 341.
\textsuperscript{131} Id. at 346.
\textsuperscript{132} Id.
\textsuperscript{134} Cohen, supra note 20, at § 1.05.
\textsuperscript{135} Id.
\textsuperscript{136} 25 U.S.C. § 479.
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The IRA also urged tribes to adopt boilerplate constitutions defining what it meant to be “Indian” in terms of ancestry and blood quantum requirements.\(^\text{139}\) Because tribal constitutions were subject to federal approval, those notions found their way into most tribal IRA constitutions.\(^\text{140}\) Over time, even those tribes that opted to forego adopting an IRA constitution were often persuaded by the federal government to adopt this definition of “Indian” somewhere in their own law.\(^\text{141}\) Thus, “while it is true that membership in an Indian tribe [wa]s for the tribe to decide, that principle is dependent on and subordinate to the more basic principle that membership in an Indian tribe is a bilateral, political relationship” under which the federal government had dictated the terms.\(^\text{142}\)

In sum, although the IRA ostensibly took a different route—i.e., modeling a constitutional form of tribal governance rather than terminating tribal sovereignty and self-governance altogether\(^\text{143}\)—the federal government’s paternalistic control over tribal governance persisted, especially as to tribal membership. Nearly 80 years after the original imposition of IRA constitutions upon tribal governments, many tribes remain “colonial institutions”; many more are plagued with “dysfunctional Indian national self-governance,”\(^\text{144}\) characterized by “disruption and heightened intra-tribal disputes,”\(^\text{145}\) most acutely due to tribal disenrollment.

**E. Termination (1943–1961)**

During the mid-twentieth century, the federal government’s Indian policy began to shift from assimilation qua reorganization, to assimilation qua “termination.” Through congressional termination policy, the federal government sought to eliminate the federal–tribal relationship altogether by terminating tribal governments’ legal existence.\(^\text{146}\) Various federal statutes eviscerated the relationship between certain tribal governments and the United States.\(^\text{147}\) The abolishment of the federal–tribal relationship meant that tribal members suddenly became non-Indian, legally speaking, and thus immediately lost their ability to access federal services.

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\(^{139}\) Notably, the Secretary urged tribes to adopt these regulations “based on the notion that it was paramount to their tribal welfare to weed out those Indians seeking membership who possessed a low blood quantum.” Laughlin, supra note 25, at 116.

\(^{140}\) Painter-Thorne, supra note 126, at 341.

\(^{141}\) Id.


\(^{143}\) See Cohen, supra note 20, at § 1.05 (noting that under the IRA “[n]ative people were encouraged to organize or reorganize with tribal structures similar to modern business corporations”).


\(^{145}\) Cohen, supra note 20, at § 1.05.


and programs for tribes and tribal members.\textsuperscript{148} By legislative edict, a terminated tribe lost its sovereign status; tribal trust lands and assets were liquidated and the cash proceeds therefrom were paid to those individuals who were tribal members pre-termination.\textsuperscript{149} Terminated tribal members became subject to the panoply of state laws and jurisdiction; again, they became non-Indian for legal purposes.\textsuperscript{150}

Although the federal government quickly abandoned the termination policies,\textsuperscript{151} the termination era serves as a constant reminder of Congress’s plenary power to legislate the complete destruction of a tribe’s sovereign status,\textsuperscript{152} as well as “a strategy for forcing the disbanding of Native communities and, with them, Native identity and culture.”\textsuperscript{153} That strategy is merely dormant today but as discussed below, disenrollment threatens to enliven tribal termination, especially at the hands of Congress.

\textbf{F. Self-Determination and Self-Governance (1961–Present)}

In the 1960s and early 1970s, federal policy shifted from termination to self-determination. The shift began in earnest when President John F. Kennedy took office. During his campaign, President Kennedy ran on an anti-termination policy, promising that “[t]here would be no change in treaty or contractual relationships without the consent of the tribes concerned” and that “[n]o steps would be taken by the Federal Government to impair the cultural heritage of any group.”\textsuperscript{154} President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Administration continued President Kennedy’s anti-termination efforts,\textsuperscript{155} and more profoundly, espoused a new federal Indian policy

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[148.] \textsc{Robert T. Coulter, Native Land Law} § 8:2 (2014) (citation omitted); \textit{see also} Marren Sanders, \textit{De Recto, De Jure, or De Facto: Another Look at the History of U.S./Tribal Relations}, 43 Sw. L. Rev. 171, 184 (2013).
\item[149.] \textsc{Coulter, supra note 148; see, e.g.,} 25 U.S.C. § 973.
\item[150.] \textsc{Coulter, supra note 148.}
\item[151.] \textit{See Remarks of Secretary of the Interior Fred A. Stanton, 105 Cong. Rec. 3105 (1959) (“It is absolutely unthinkable . . . that consideration would be given to forcing upon an Indian tribe a so-called termination plan which did not have the understanding and acceptance of a clear majority of the members of the affected tribe.”}).
\item[152.] \textit{See Mark N. Trahant, The Last Great Battle of the Indian Wars 12 (2010) (“[E]ven the word ‘terminate’ carries with it allusions of war, death, and destruction. The policy implemented the horrible idea that . . . culture had to be killed to save the person.”).}
\item[153.] \textsc{Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, The State of Native Nations 18 (2008).}
\item[155.] \textit{See Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1181, 1191 n.51 (1983) (“The Johnson administration made no effort to increase the scope of termination.”).}
\end{enumerate}
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of “self-determination.” In a Special Message to Congress in 1968, President Johnson stated: “I propose, in short, a policy of maximum choice for the American Indian . . . a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, self-determination.” 156 In 1970, President Nixon took self-determination to the next level, when he proclaimed the following to Congress in his own Special Message:

Both as a matter of justice and as a matter of enlightened social policy, we must begin to act on the basis of what the Indians themselves have long been telling us. The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions. . . . Th[e] policy of forced termination is wrong . . . . Self-determination among the Indian people can and must be encouraged without the threat of eventual termination. In my view, in fact, that is the only way that self-determination can effectively be fostered. 157

President Nixon’s Special Message was chiefly effectuated by the passage of the Indian Self-Determination Education Assistance Act of 1975 ("ISDEAA"). 158 But as alluded above, in order for tribes to receive certain federal benefits that allowed them to take over federal Indian programs, 159 ISDEAA required that tribal governments, subject to federal approval, devise formal membership and disenrollment regulations. 160 As such, IRA constitutional definitions of “Indian” vis-à-vis blood quantum, were imposed upon virtually every tribe in the land.

In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time acknowledged Congress’s tribal self-determination policy in the landmark Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 161 decision. The plaintiff, Julia Martinez, was a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo who was married to a nonmember Navajo Indian. 162 Ms. Martinez filed suit because her children were denied tribal membership pursuant to a 1939 Santa Clara Ordinance that prohibited children of women who married outside of the Tribe from becoming members. 163 Because the Ordinance did not impose the same prohibitions on the children of male Pueblo members, Martinez alleged that the Tribe had violated her right to equal protection, as guaranteed by the

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157. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564, 565 (July 8, 1970).
158. United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1990). On the efforts of getting the ISDEAA passed, see generally TRAHIANT, supra note 152, at 66–71.
163. Id.
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”).  

Relying on *Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of Southern Ute Reservation*, the Pueblo argued “federal courts lack jurisdiction over intertribal controversies, particularly those involving membership disputes.”

The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico disagreed with the Pueblo. According to the court, while it may have been true that under *Martinez* intratribal controversies, among them membership disputes, did not “arise under” the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, *Martinez* was decided before the enactment of the ICRA. Under the ICRA, the court held, allegations that a membership ordinance is being applied in a discriminatory manner not only create a federal question, but also abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed.

Looking to the merits—by weighing the individual right to fair treatment under the law against the tribal interest in traditional Indian culture—the court found that because “the ordinance was the product of economics and pragmatics” and not “Santa Clara tradition,” Martinez’s individual right necessarily outweighed that of the Pueblo.

In its petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Pueblo again asserted that the ICRA did not authorize federal courts to review violations of its provisions except as they might arise on habeas corpus and, further, that the ICRA did not waive the tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit. The Court agreed, and disposed of the case procedurally:

> [E]fforts by the federal judiciary to apply the statutory prohibitions of § 1302 in a civil context may substantially interfere with a tribe’s ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity . . . A tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community. Given the often vast gulf between tribal traditions and those with which federal courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action that would intrude on these delicate matters . . . As we have repeatedly emphasized, Congress’ authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts in adjusting relations between and among tribes and their members correspondingly

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164. *Id.* (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012)) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law . . . “).

165. 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957).


167. *Id.*

168. *Id.*


170. *Id.* at 1045.

171. *Id.* at 1047.

restrained. Congress retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions for injunctive or other relief . . . [b]ut unless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that [ICRA] does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.\footnote{173}

While *Santa Clara Pueblo* has been hailed as one of the “major wins for tribal interests [in] the modern era favoring Indian tribes,”\footnote[174]{\textit{Santa Clara Pueblo}, 436 U.S. at 65, 65 n.32, 71 (citation omitted); see also DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1989) (“In *Santa Clara Pueblo* . . . , the Supreme Court held that federal court enforcement of the ICRA is limited to habeas corpus jurisdiction on behalf of persons in tribal custody [and that] the ICRA cannot be directly enforced against Indian tribes because they are shielded from suit by sovereign immunity.”); Shefali Milezarek-Desai, (Re)locating Other/Third World Women: An Alternative Approach to *Santa Clara Pueblo* v. Martinez’s Construction of Gender, Culture and Identity, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 235, 267 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court avoided the binary discourse altogether by holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the case in the first place.”).} it is important to understand exactly why. First, under *Santa Clara Pueblo*, a valid act of Congress may impose rigorous duties on tribal governments, but it does not necessarily create a cause of action for an infringement or violation of those duties.\footnote[175]{Id. at 617.} Second, congressional waivers of a tribe’s immunity from suit to redress (e.g., civil or human rights violations) must be express, and cannot be implied.\footnote[176]{Id.}

*Santa Clara Pueblo did not and does not* stand for the proposition that tribal membership is “a matter within the exclusive province of the tribes themselves”—a matter that the federal government absolutely lacks the authority to intervene in.\footnote[177]{\textit{Cahto Tribe of the Laytonville Rancheria v. Pac. Reg’l Dir.}, 38 IBIA 244, 249, 2002 WL 32345916, at *4 (2002) (citing *Santa Clara Pueblo*, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32).} *Santa Clara Pueblo did not and does not* hold that the BIA has no “authority to intervene in internal tribal matters so to protect tribal autonomy and self government activities.”\footnote[178]{\textit{Weimas & Dukic v. Sacramento Area Director}, 24 IBIA 264, 267, 1993 WL 530308, at *3 (1993) (citing *Santa Clara Pueblo*, 436 U.S. at 49).} *Santa Clara Pueblo* is not “[t]he foundational case on tribal membership”—its relatively narrow holding had absolutely nothing to do with enrollment or disenrollment; it was purely jurisdictional. Indeed, in 1988—ten years after *Santa Clara Pueblo*—the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) continued to acknowledge that, while tribes do possess the authority to set tribal membership standards, their authority has always been subservient to the Secretary of the Interior:

> [W]hile it is true that membership in an Indian tribe is for the tribe to decide, that principle is dependent on and subordinate to the [DOI].\footnote[179]{Lewis III, supra note 5, at 9.}
A tribe does not have authority under the guise of determining its own membership to include as members persons who are not maintaining some meaningful sort of political relationship with the tribal government. The DOI has concluded that it has broad and possibly nonreviewable authority to disapprove or withhold approval . . . regarding membership . . . . 180

As “a delegated authority,” any tribal authority to disenroll tribal members “must necessarily be subservient to the [agency] by which the delegation was made”—here, the BIA. 181 In fact, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual contains an entire section on how the BIA must go about approving or disapproving disenrollment decisions. 182 But as discussed below, the BIA now conveniently ignores federal law and even its own policies, to turn a blind eye to matters of tribal disenrollment.

G. Indian Gaming & Self-Termination (1988–Present)

Through the late twenty-first century, a new era of self-determination took hold, which Professor Charles F. Wilkinson describes as a “forced transition to a cash economy.” 183 This “cash economy” began in earnest in 1988, when Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). 184 The purpose of the IGRA was “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” 185 In so doing, the IGRA set limits, for example, on the type of

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180. Memorandum from Scott Keep, Ass’t Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to the Chief of the Division of Tribal Government Services 6 (Mar. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Keep Memo]. The Keep Memo was cited as persuasive authority for the position that the BIA possesses the authority to regulate tribal membership in Masayesva ex rel Hopi Indian Tribe v. Zah, 792 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 1992); see also Kirsty Gover, Tribal Constitutionalism: States, Tribes, and the Governance of Membership 126 (2010) (citing the Keep Memo for the proposition that the federal executive may determine for itself whether or not to maintain a political relationship with certain individuals).


184. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012). It is important to note here that not all tribes are involved in gaming, and not all gaming enterprises are successful. Less than half of federally recognized tribes are involved in casino-style gaming. W. Gregory Guedel, Sovereignty, Economic Development, and Human Security in Native American Nations, 3 Am. Indian L.J. 17, 33 (2014). “Due to geographic and economic factors, particularly travel distances from reservations to major population centers, gaming is not a viable economic activity for many Native American nations.” Id.

gaming that tribal governments might provide; where Indian gaming may occur; and what gaming revenues might be used for. As to the latter, the IGRA mandates that revenues from Indian gaming be used only for: (1) funding tribal government services; (2) providing for the tribe’s general welfare; (3) promoting economic and community development; (4) donating to charitable organizations; and (5) aiding local governments. A tribe may request that it be allowed to make per-capita payments to tribal members after those enumerated expenditures have been accounted for. Specifically, the IGRA “requires that a distribution plan be approved by the Secretary of the Interior before the Tribe can make per-capita payments to any members.”

While only one-fourth of gaming tribes have elected to distribute per-capita payments, many of those tribes have experienced heated internal dissent regarding “who qualifies for membership and thus is eligible for payments.” This has played the largest part in the current disenrollment crisis. In some tribes, membership is the difference between rags and riches. As of 2013, Indian gaming generated $28 billion in gross gaming revenues annually. Indian casinos in California alone generated approximately $7 billion in gaming revenue in 2012, even amidst the Great Recession. For example, the Table Mountain Rancheria recently brought in

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186. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
187. Id. § 2710(b)(3). While it was originally thought that per-capita payments fell within the IGRA’s allowance of funding for “promoting . . . economic development,” a recent study found that the opposite is true. According to W. Gregory Guedel, there is actually “an inverse correlation between per capita payments and poverty reduction.” Guedel, supra note 184.
189. Ted Jojola & Paul Ong, Indian Gaming as Community Economic Development, in Jobs and Economic Development in Minority Communities 213, 219 (Paul M. Ong & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris eds., 2006); see also Painter-Thorne, supra note 126, at 317 (“[P]er capita payments . . . , many critics allege, . . . are the root of tribal enrollment disputes.”).
over $100 million,\textsuperscript{194} roughly $380,000 of which was paid out in per-capita payments to its 60 members.\textsuperscript{195} For small tribes like Table Mountain, the addition or subtraction of a single member can literally mean thousands of dollars added or subtracted from the remaining members’ monthly per-capita checks—another’s membership can literally be reduced to cash in hand.\textsuperscript{196}

Prior to the imposition of federal policy, tribal governments were very inclusive.\textsuperscript{197} But as tribes became more dependent on the free-market economic system, tribal mass disenrollment became a viable option to protect per-capita payments, thereby reinvigorating the federal government’s assimilation and termination policies.\textsuperscript{198} Indeed, due to Indian gaming qua “self-determination,” commercialism, individualism, and greed have supplanted tribalism in many tribal communities.\textsuperscript{199}

Ironically, disenrollment is antithetical to tribal self-determination and self-sufficiency via economic development.\textsuperscript{200} In most instances, tribal disenrollment serves only to harm a tribe’s bottom line by creating negative media and investor perceptions that indicate greed and corruption.\textsuperscript{201} Potential business partners may also conclude that working with a tribal government engaged in deserting its own citizens is not worth the risk to investment.\textsuperscript{202}

Despite its current hands-off approach to so-called internal matters, at times the federal government has been actively involved tribal disenrollment disputes in the past. In \textit{Holloman v. Watt}, the plaintiffs sued the federal government for loss of gaming revenue may have reached “peak level with limited future growth potential.” Guedel, \textit{supra} note 184, at 26.


\textsuperscript{196} \textit{See Painter-Thorne, supra} note 126, at 319 (“Each additional member decreases the current members’ revenue distributions . . .”).

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{See supra} notes 54–56.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{See Dao, supra} note 30 (“For centuries, American Indian tribes have banished people as punishment for serious offenses. But only in recent years, experts say, have they begun routinely disenrolling Indians deemed inauthentic members of a group.”). As described by Professor Wilkinson, “[t]he concept of sharing, integral to Indian societies, did not jibe well with the individualistic, materialistic attitude that drove the nation’s economic system.” \textit{Wilkinson, supra} note 183.

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{See Painter-Thorne, supra} note 126, at 313 (“To the extent these conflicts are about greed, it is surely implicated on both sides. Disputes over membership involve both claims by individuals seeking access to a portion of the gaming revenue pie, as well as efforts to exclude members to ensure the pie is not divided up quite as much and each member’s share thereby reduced.”).


\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Id.}
tribal privileges after they were disenrolled from the Colville Indian Tribe. Decades after the plaintiffs were enrolled as members, the BIA learned that there was “a discrepancy in the blood degree” listed on the 1937 Colville tribal roll, and informed the Colville Tribal Council that those members were not in fact entitled to enrollment. The Colville Tribe took no action, but the BIA urged the Tribal Council to disenroll them. Years later, though, “the BIA discovered and corrected another error on the 1937 Tribal roll, [which] resulted in a determination that [the members] were eligible for tribal membership” after all. The Tribal Council then re-enrolled the members, but only at the BIA’s demand.

The BIA remained involved in disenrollment disputes through the 1990s. For example, in *Allery v. Swimmer*, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs in response to the BIA’s attempt to recalculate blood quantum on the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa’s roll. If the BIA were allowed to have done so, the agency would have administratively disenrolled 752 members from the Band without its action or consent. The plaintiffs filed the suit to prevent the proposed mass disenrollment, asserting that the BIA does not have the authority to determine tribal membership, or to reduce the blood quantum of those members listed on a 1943 Band roll. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York ruled in favor of the BIA, holding that “blood quantum figures may be corrected, even though the effect may be to disenroll some members and enroll others.” In other words, the *Allery* court affirmed the BIA’s authority to involve itself in tribal disenrollment matters.

While *Santa Clara Pueblo* states that “[a] tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community,” it was not until 2009 that federal authority to disenroll tribal members and tribal authority to set limits on membership

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203. 708 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1983).
204. *Id.*
205. *Id.* at 1401–02. The BIA urged: “[A]ction should be taken by the [Tribal] Business Council to remove their names from the roll as they are not eligible [to be] members of the Tribe.” *Id.*
206. *Id.* at 1401.
207. *Id.*
208. *Id.*
210. *Id.* at 127.
211. *Id.*
212. *Id.*
213. *Id.* at 131; see also Thompson v. County of Franklin, 180 F.R.D. 216 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (determining that an enrolled member of the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe was no longer entitled to membership, with no input from the Tribe).
were considered in tandem.\textsuperscript{215} In \textit{Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Kennedy},\textsuperscript{216} multiple factions of the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe became embroiled in a bitter dispute over casino management and revenue. As explained by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California:

\begin{quote}
In an attempt to gain leadership and control over the tribe, funded by dueling Casino prospecting businesses, [the] factions have held separate elections and run parallel and competing tribal governments since 2006 . . . . Each faction claiming to be authorized representatives of the Tribe, bank accounts are opened in the Tribe’s name only to be closed or frozen once the bank becomes aware of the governance dispute. Adding to the confusion, [one] faction, after re-examining enrollment records, disenrolled over 70 people from the Tribe, including Plaintiffs . . . . These actions have caused harm to the parties, the Tribe, non-party Tribe members, former Tribe members, government agencies and their agents, and businesses in the area surrounding tribal lands.\textsuperscript{217}
\end{quote}

As to standing, the court needed to determine whether one faction’s disenrollment of the other was valid, because arguably, only tribal members would have standing to petition the court for the relief sought.\textsuperscript{218} To this, the court ruled as follows:

\begin{quote}
Internal matters of a tribe are generally reserved for resolution by the tribe itself, through a policy of Indian self-determination and self-government . . . . Based on these principles, the BIA will not interfere in the disenrollment issue. [I]n response to Plaintiffs’ dispute of the disenrollment, the BIA wrote: “The BIA adheres to a policy of Indian self-determination and self-government . . . . The BIA carries out a government-to-government relationship with the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe that includes the administration of trust and federally appropriated funds for which we are held accountable. It has long been the policy of the Department of the Interior and the BIA, in promoting self-determination, not become involved in the internal affairs of tribal governments . . . .” Similarly, without authority, this Court will not interfere in the internal affairs of the Tribe.\textsuperscript{219}
\end{quote}

With the stroke of that judge’s pen, the court sanctioned the BIA’s supposedly long-held—but in reality, new—policy of non-involvement in membership disputes. The BIA has never looked back.

In reality, the BIA is confused—as was the \textit{Timbisha Shoshone} court—in the agency’s belief that its authority to interfere in disenrollment determinations has somehow been swallowed by a self-imposed BIA “policy” not to interfere in

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{215} While cases such as \textit{Quair v. Sisco}, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Cal. 2004), surely discuss “disenrollment,” they do so in the context of whether the individual has alleged a federal cause of action under the ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1301, not whether the BIA possesses the authority to intervene in disenrollment determinations.
\textsuperscript{216} 687 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Id.} at 1175.
\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Id.} at 1183–84.
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Id.} at 1185 (citation omitted).
\end{flushleft}
disenrollment determinations. Without any tribal consultation or administrative rulemaking, the BIA has for the last half-decade only proclaimed that its hands are tied because of “tribal authority to set limits on membership” and thus the agency cannot make decisions pursuant to tribal law. But this assertion misses the point. The BIA does have the authority to involve itself in disenrollment determinations, through its power—indeed, mandate—to establish a trust relationship with those individuals recognized as tribal members. Policy is not law; enrollment is not disenrollment.

Meanwhile, despite the federal government’s favor toward self-determination, little has been done to extricate termination and assimilation policy remnants from tribal governing documents and federal law—all of which is wielded to disenroll tribal members en masse. Having caused the disenrollment epidemic over the last 200 years, Congress and the BIA must now do something to help find a cure.

II. Case Studies

The following disenrollment case studies from the last 100 years demonstrate how the various federal policies at work during that span girder disenrollment, which ultimately operate in ways that are antithetical to tribal sovereignty and self-determination. These examples also demonstrate how for nearly a century before modern Indian gaming, and certainly ever since, there has been a close correlation between federally prescribed distributions of tribal governmental assets and monies to tribal members on a pro-rata or per-capita basis, and tribal governmental mass disenrollment of tribal members.

A. Disenrollment and the Effect of the U.S. Government’s Assimilation Policies

Here, we provide two examples of the negative effect that federal assimilation policies had on tribal members and their governments. Specifically, we

220. Gabriel S. Galanda, Disenrollment IS a Federal Action, INDIAN COUNTY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Mar. 10, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/03/10/disenrollment-federal-action (“Interior takes the position that it ‘does not get involved in individual tribal matters [of disenrollment] unless the agency’s participation is included in the tribal constitution.’ That position results from a decision made by a few BIA career folks not even 10 years ago [who] simply decided from behind closed doors that the agency should no longer get involved in disenrollment controversies.”) (brackets in original).


223. Id.: see also Potter v. Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y-Indian Affairs, 10 IBIA 33, 39, 1982 WL 42970, at *4 (1982) (Muskrat, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen BIA has information in its possession indicating that an enrollment decision is incorrect, ambiguous, or is based on incorrect facts or a mistake of law, BIA is obligated by its trust responsibility to inform the tribe of the problem and to seek clarification or correction of the individual’s enrollment status.”).

focus upon the federal government’s “disenrollment” invention and the intentional destruction that it caused the Osage and Creek Nations.

1. Case Study: Osage Allotment

In 1825, the federal government removed the “Great and Little Osage Indians” to an area along the southeast Kansas border as part of its removal campaign. In 1870, Congress again removed the Osage, this time to Indian Territory held in trust for the Cherokee Nation. What was unique about this act was that it required that Osage lands in Kansas be sold, and that, subject to federal approval, the Osage select and purchase new lands from the Cherokee. The sale of the Osage’s Kansas lands yielded roughly $7 million, which enabled the Osage to purchase roughly 1.4 million acres of handpicked Cherokee land. The Osage was the only American Indian tribe to purchase its own reservation. It was later discovered that the land selected by the Osage sat atop one of the largest deposits of oil in the United States. Leasing this land equated to new money for the Osage, and lots of it.

Determined to ensure that this newfound wealth would not benefit the Osage Nation, Congress passed the Osage Allotment Act (the “Osage Act”) in 1906. The Osage Act caused a remarkable and unprecedented divestiture of Osage’s beneficial interest in nearly all tribal lands, accrued funds, and future revenues, and—in furtherance of federal assimilation policies—transferred the beneficial interest in substantially all of these assets to individual Osage Indians. The Osage Act: (1) provided for the sale of buildings used by tribal government; (2) transferred essentially all remaining Osage lands to 2,229 Osage Indians whose names were on a roll maintained by the U.S. Indian Agent at the Osage Agency, as of January 1, 1906, and to their children born by July 1, 1907; and (3) reserved the entire interest in the former Osage tribal mineral estate for the exclusive benefit of

228. OIG REPORT, supra note 225.
229. Id.
231. As of 2014, the Osage mineral estate was worth an estimated $4 billion. OIG REPORT, supra note 225, at 22. It is estimated that drilling additional wells between 2012 and 2027 will generate $13.6 billion in headright payments. Id. The federal government has, however, has grossly mismanaged these funds, however. Although a discussion of Osage headright mismanagement is beyond the scope of this Article, we note that even after a $380 million settlement in 2011, the federal government currently has in place an “ineffective program for managing the Osage Nation’s mineral estate.” Id. at 1.
233. Id. at 540–41.
those 2,229 individuals—so-called “headright” owners—leaving the Nation only a small allowance to manage the minerals. The Osage Act was intended to, and did, transform Osage tribal property to the individual.

As to the designation of Osage headright owners vis-à-vis federal rolls, in Logan v. Andrus the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma found that Congress was “exercis[ing] its plenary power to control membership in Indian tribes” by “defin[ing] for all purposes the members of the Osage Tribe of Indians [and] g[iving] to the Principal Chief the authority to file with the Secretary of the Interior a list of names which the tribe claimed were placed upon the roll by fraud.” Logan made explicit that the federal government possesses the “plenary power” to set membership criteria and to oversee disenrollment actions.

By 1920, the Osage were considered to be “the wealthiest group of people on the planet.” In 1925, the annual income from an Osage headright was $13,200—or $177,817 in 2014, adjusted for inflation. But the combination of exorbitant, new individual wealth, and an Osage tribal government removed from its homelands, soon proved disastrous, prompting scholars to since proclaim that the Osage Act was “the most destructive . . . regulatory scheme . . . ever devised by Indian policymakers.”

First, the infusion of significant income from oil headrights led to violence and conflict within the Nation. As described by Professor Rennard Strickland, “[t]he Osage Act of 1906 broke with the traditional property ownership and transfer system of the Osage people. It created a wealth transfer scheme that tempted unscrupulous whites to intermarry for the purpose of accumulating headrights

234. A headright is statutorily defined as “any right of any person to share in any royalties, rents, sales, or bonuses arising from the Osage mineral estate.” Pub. L. No. 98-605, § 11(2), 98 Stat. 3163 (1984); see also Shelton’s Estate v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 544 P.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir. 1975) (“[H]eadrights are interests in unaccrued royalties arising from mineral interests.”).

235. Osage Allotment Act, 34 Stat. at 540–41; see also Fletcher v. United States, No. 02-0427, 2012 WL 1109090, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2012) (“The royalties received from the mineral estate, less certain amounts retained for tribal purposes, is paid per capita on a quarterly basis to the 2,229 persons on the tribal roll, their heirs, devisees, and assigns.”).

236. See also Rennard Strickland, Osage Oil: Mineral Law, Murder, Mayhem, and Manipulation, 10 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, 39, 40 (1995).

237. Logan v. Andrus, 457 F. Supp. 1318, 1326 (N.D. Okla. 1978); but see Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Cautionary Tale of the Osage Indian Nation’s Attempt to Survive it’s Wealth, 9 CAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 815, 822 (2000) (“There is nothing in the 1906 Act specifically giving the Secretary the power to determine the future membership of the Tribe . . . . Placement on the rolls was contingent on meeting the traditional tribal standards for membership and was done with the advice and consent of the Tribe.”).

238. Logan, 457 F. Supp. at 1326.

239. OWINGS, supra note 230.


241. Strickland, supra note 236, at 42.

through inheritance after murdering Osage allottees.\textsuperscript{243} By the end of the infighting, as many as 300 Osages met unnatural deaths.\textsuperscript{244} Here, the law failed to protect these individuals not because of its failure to offer a remedy—murder in in Indian country or elsewhere was clearly prohibited\textsuperscript{245}—but because of the complicity of those charged with its enforcement.\textsuperscript{246} The federal government stood idly by as Osage annuitants were treated with triviality and their deaths were ignored.\textsuperscript{247} The federal government—the trustee charged with supervision of the mineral estate monies—“looked at the balance sheet of oil dollars and ignored the human devastation.”\textsuperscript{248}

Second, in order to maintain Osage headright payout amounts, headright holders had incentive to urge that the federal government disallow new Osage members,\textsuperscript{249} regardless of authentic claims to Osage ancestry.\textsuperscript{250} Under the headright structure, tribal membership was centered on a corporate model of headright shares.\textsuperscript{251} Rather than permitting the Osage to act as a government, as they had in 1881, the headright structure sought to make the Osage nothing more than stockholders in a minerals corporation.\textsuperscript{252} Osage peoples could not participate in tribal politics without inheriting a share in the mineral estate from somebody listed on the roll.\textsuperscript{253} Thus, two classes of Osage Indians were created—one with money and membership, and one without. As noted by Professor Jean Dennison, due to the headright system being linked to quarterly financial payouts, “all attempts to open up membership were challenged as merely attempts to redistribute this money. By the twenty-first century, this form of government had left nearly 16,000 of the approximately 20,000 people with Osage ancestry without voting rights, alienating them from tribal politics.”\textsuperscript{254}

Finally, Osage headright holders were immediately motivated to disenroll other Osage members, by alleging that certain Osage families were “placed upon the

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\item[243.] Strickland, supra note 236, at 42.
\item[244.] Id. at 43.
\item[245.] See, e.g., Ex parte Columbia George, 144 F. 985, 986 (W.D. Wash. 1906).
\item[246.] Id.
\item[247.] Id.
\item[248.] Id.
\item[249.] See Application of Irene Kohpay, Now Cornell, for Enrollment on the Roll of the Osage Tribe of Indians, 67 Interior Dec. 89, 1960 WL 8927 (Mar. 8, 1960) (holding that there can be no additions to the Osage rolls because “[t]he Allotment Act makes the roll, as finally approved by the Secretary of the Interior, final and conclusive” (quoting Jump v. Ellis, 22 F. Supp. 380, 382 (N.D. Okla.), aff’d, 100 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1938))). To this very day, headright owners have “significant influence over” the federal government’s management of tribal resources in this regard. OIG REPORT, supra note 225, at 1.
\item[250.] See Strickland, supra note 236, at 41 (“Most persons of Osage Indian ancestry own no headrights . . . .”).
\item[252.] Id.
\item[253.] Id.
\item[254.] Id.
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On August 16, 1907—barely a year after the Osage Act was passed—Osage headright holders submitted to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior the names of 244 persons from eleven families who they sought to have disenrolled. Luckily for the Osage disenrollees, the Osage Act contained an appellate provision that left the ultimate determination to the Secretary of the Interior, provided the Osage Nation carry its burden by “affirmatively show[ing],” by “newly discovered evidence,” that the “names have been placed upon said roll by fraud.”

After evidentiary hearings, the Osage’s Allotment Commission transmitted its findings—that a number of Osage members had been fraudulently enrolled—to the Office of Indian Affairs for secretarial approval. The Secretary, however, “found that the tribe failed to establish its claim of fraud and the enrollment of all contestees was sustained,” deferring to the federal government’s 1906 Osage rolls as “the names of persons whose rights had previously been investigated and . . . were found by the [U.S. Department of the Interior] to be entitled to enrollment.” The Secretary’s decision was final and non-appealable. Despite the aforesaid destruction to the Osage Nation, this case study demonstrates the federal government’s longstanding role in tribal mass disenrollment controversies, and its ability to provide a remedy for disenrollees is not out of sight.

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255. Logan v. Andrus, 457 F. Supp. 1318, 1326 (N.D. Okla. 1978). But see DENNIS MCAULIFFE, BLOODLAND: A FAMILY STORY OF OIL, GREED AND MURDER ON THE OSAGE RESERVATION 224 (1999) (suggesting that disenrollment may have been warranted in this instance, due to “[t]he U.S. government . . . packing the Osages’ membership roll with whites and non-Osage Indians who claimed to be mixed-blood Osages—and who favored allotment” in order to “one day soon tip the scale in a tribal vote on whether to accept the [GAA]”). When this scheme backfired, the BIA “suspended Osage government indefinitely” and the pro-allotment campaign was ramped up. Id. at 226. Between 1898 and 1906, the federal government had added roughly 1,370 pro-allotment persons to the roll. Id. The disenrollment provision of the Allotment Act was negotiated so that the Osage might undo the BIA’s vote-packing. Id.


257. Osage Allotment Act, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 540 (1906). As discussed infra notes 287–89 and accompanying text, many disenrollees are left without a neutral appellate body to review the disenrollment decisions of their tribal governments.

258. Chapman, supra note 256.

259. Id.


261. See id. at 49 (“[R]esort had been originally permitted to the courts, but the experience had been so unsatisfactory that Congress rejected that and repealed the provisions as to court review and made the decision of the Secretary of the Interior final . . . .”); Skibine, supra note 237, at 821 (“[F]inal authority to remove such names was given to the Secretary of the Interior.”).
2. Case Study: Creek Nation

In 1834, as part of the removal agenda, Congress designated the part of the United States west of the Mississippi River (excluding the states of Louisiana and Missouri and the Arkansas territory) as "Indian Territory." The tribes of the area—also known as the "Five Civilized Tribes"—had generally acknowledged American legal standards and had incorporated these standards within tribal law. An influx of non-Indians westward created a jurisdictional problem, however, in that tribal governments generally could not assert their inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians. Thus, in 1844, Congress passed an act that made it a crime to trade with Indians without a license, disturb the peace in Indian Territory, or injure the property of Indians, and gave enforcement jurisdiction to federal courts.

264. Wilson, supra note 262, at 4; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121, 147 (2006) ("[T]he history of tribal court development is spotty. The first tribal courts for many reservations were the old Courts of Indian Offenses, later known as CFR Courts. These courts are Article II courts created by the Secretary of the Interior and run by the BIA to regulate the reservation activities of Indians."). On CFR Courts, see generally Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, Courts of Indian Offenses, in Introduction to Tribal Legal Studies 76–77 (Jerry Gardner ed., 2004).
265. Wilson, supra note 262, at 4. If they wished to, however, "tribes were generally assumed to have territorial authority over all persons living on or passing through reservations . . . ." Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 1499, 1519 (2013). The Chickasaw Nation’s imposition of an occupational license tax on non-Indians engaged as laborers, merchants, traders, and physicians within the Chickasaw territory in 1876 offers one example. Angie Debo, The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic 140–42 (1934); Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 110 (1877). In 1878 and 1879, Congress specifically considered and acquiesced to this exercise of tribal power over non-Indians. S. Rep. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. 1–3 (1879); 7 Cong. Rec. 2911 (1878); 8 Cong. Rec. 929 (1879). Shortly thereafter, in 1881 and 1884, two Attorneys General gave formal opinions further approving of this exercise of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 134, 135 (1881); 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 34, 35 (1884); see also 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 214, 216, 217 (1900). In Crabtree v. Madden, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first federal court order affirming tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 54 F. 426 (8th Cir. 1893); see also Maxey v. Wright, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
267. Id.; Wilson, supra note 262, at 6. Until 1893, it was also assumed that the Indian Territory courts would replace any tribal adjudicatory bodies. Kerry Wynn, The State of Oklahoma, in The United States: Oklahoma to Wyoming 978–79 (Benjamin F. Shearer ed., 2004).
One of the first tribal disenrollment actions that was appealed to a federal forum took place in the U.S. District Court for the Indian Territory. In 1856, as part of the removal program, the Creeks signed a treaty with the United States that guaranteed them “the unrestricted right of self-government,” full jurisdiction over persons and property within their borders, and a one-time payment of $400,000. The money was to be paid per-capita, $25,000 per annum, to Creek members individually. On June 14, 1866, the Creek Nation signed a second treaty, ceding and conveying a large portion of its land to the United States in exchange for, among other benefits, $600,000 in additional per-capita payments to each individual Creek member.

In 1895, in the throes of the federal allotment era, the Creek Nation claimed that “by questionable and unjust methods and practices many noncitizens had been counted as citizens and participated in the per-capita distribution of the public funds of the Nation,” allegedly causing “great injustice to bona fide citizens of the Nation.” In response, the Creek government created a Committee of Eighteen on Census Rolls to: (1) “take charge of the census rolls of the various towns and carefully examine the same and ascertain whether or not they are correct”; (2) expunge from the rolls all names of persons found to be incorrectly enrolled; and (3) “entertain and consider any and all challenges and questions urged in good faith by any respectable citizen against the claim of any person to citizenship.” The Nation also established an appellate tribunal named the “Citizenship Commission” to “sit as a high court and try, determine and settle all . . . causes as shall involve the question of the right of citizenship.” All individuals brought before the appellate tribunal were granted the right to counsel, and “all other rights usual and incident to” all other actions “in a court of justice before the Nation,” including the right to file written briefs and to subpoena witnesses.

In 1897, numerous Creek Indians filed a petition with the U.S. District Court for the Indian Territory, alleging that they were wrongly disenrolled by the Creek Committee of Eighteen. A federal Special Master found the Committee’s...
decision to be “startling on account of the corruption and folly . . . .” According to the Special Master:

[T]here was no reason whatsoever for the actions of the committee, and . . . parties were stricken off the rolls who had lived in the Creek nation all their lives and were full blood Creek Indians, whose citizenship could not be disputed by any one . . . [One Committee member] had no reason for his action except that he wanted revenge, because certain of the members of his own town had been stricken off the rolls . . . . [T]he action of the committee was ridiculous and childish, and that I am of the opinion that no respect should be shown to their decisions.

On review, however, the U.S. District Court for the Indian Territory declined to adopt the Special Master’s decision as a matter of jurisdiction. According to the court, tribes possess an unfettered right to “control the question of citizenship, and . . . when the nation has exercised its authority that authority and the method pointed out by it is not subject to correction by any direct appeal from the judgment of the tribal authorities.” Whether the Committee of Eighteen was correct in its analysis or its motives were “immaterial”—the matter was “beyond the judicial determination of the court.” The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the district court’s decision. As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts generally did not possess jurisdiction to adjudicate disenrollment disputes—the Court held that the executive branch alone held the power to recognize or refuse to recognize the disenrollment actions of tribal governments.

277. Id. at 58.
278. Id. at 59.
279. Id. at 56.
280. Id. at 71; see also id. at 93 (“[I]t was within the power of the council to withdraw . . . all of the rights and privileges of citizenship . . . and that determination is not subject to correction by any direct appeal from the judgment of the Creek council.”).
281. Id. at 79; see also id. at 86 (“The Court is not authorized to inquire into the motives which actuated the members of the council . . . .”)
282. Id. at 89. Note that this did nothing to affect the BIA’s ability to interfere in disenrollment disputes. As discussed supra notes 165–82 and accompanying text, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction—the fact that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere in disenrollment disputes says nothing of the federal government’s ability to do so.
283. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); see also Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897) (“[W]ithdrawal from plaintiff of all the rights and privileges of citizenship in the Chickasaw Nation, has been practically determined by the authorities of that nation, and that determination is not subject to correction by any direct appeal from the judgment of the Chickasaw courts.”).
284. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865) (“In reference to all matters of [Indian affairs], it is the rule of this court to follow the action of the executive and other political departments of the government . . . .”); W. Shoshone Bus. Council ex rel. W. Shoshone Tribe of Duck Valley Reservation v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "the [E]xecutive's exclusive power to govern relations with foreign governments"
3. Analysis

The plight of the Osage and the Creek Indians are just two stories of federal tactics used to assimilate and subjugate tribal governments. Notable in both examples is the element of federally prescribed per-capita payments to tribal individuals, as opposed to payments to the Osage and Creek tribal governments with whom the United States signed treaties. This was not unintentional—it was a purposeful modus of the federal government’s campaign to usurp tribal governments’ social and economic institutions.

Contributing to these breakdowns was the (un)reviewability of disenrollment decisions. As to the Creek, disenrollment decisions were generally not reviewable, even where there was no forum to contest the decision because a tribal court did not exist, or where a tribal court did exist but “declined to entertain jurisdiction” over such decisions. The Osage Act, on the other hand, made disenrollment decisions reviewable by the Secretary of the Interior—who found that his de novo review of disenrollment decisions by a politically charged tribal government was not what the law intended.

But it was when the federal government began to pick and choose which faction to “recognize,” that an American Indian group or subgroup’s identity started to vanish at federal whim. In turn, the federal government’s mandate, in exercise of its “absolute authority” over tribal affairs, to define within its own narrative exactly what or who is “the tribe,” escalated intratribal conflict. The process of being recognized by the executive branch, in other words, became a zero-sum game within a tribe, with clear winners and losers. American Indians immediately internalized a dichotomous tribal worldview because they had no choice.

has always been understood to apply to “determinations of tribal recognition”) (citing United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 445 (1903)).

285. See Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 394 (1998) (“[E]ven the small reservations were held in common by all members of a tribe, each of whom agreed that land was not intended to be privately owned.”).


287. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salinas v. Lamere, 126 S. Ct. 2291 (2006) (No. 05-1189), 2006 WL 690661 at *7 (noting that the Tribe initiating disenrollment “has no duly constituted Tribal Court, and thus no forum for meaningful judicial review”).

288. Roff, 168 U.S. at 223.


290. BARKER, supra note 22, at 33.

291. Id.

292. See id. at 225 (“U.S. national narrations [of] Native cultures and identities . . . have their own political aims at Native disposition and disenfranchisement and work to discipline and otherwise coerce Native peoples to think of their legal and political options and cultural selves in those terms.”).
Finally, the federal government’s blatant disregard of its fiduciary duty—via the failure to intervene in the face of palpable harm to tribal peoples—is clear from these case studies. While the federal government did finally intervene in the Creek matter, it took the deaths of over 100 Creek Indians before it did so.294 Hundreds more Osage died at the hands of non-Indians seeking lucrative headrights.295 What makes this particularly disconcerting is that federal policies were in fact causing the harm, and the federal government knew it, but remained complicit until its hand was forced.297

Unfortunately, each and every one of these dynamics persist today, as demonstrated below.

B. Disenrollment and the Effect of the IRA

Here, we discuss a current mass tribal disenrollment dispute, chiefly catalyzed by federal Indian reorganization policies.

1. Case Study: Nooksack298

The Nooksack Tribe’s disenrollment began in 1998 when “a 200-member family of mixed Filipino and Indian descent” obtained a majority vote on the tribal

293.  This duty was described in United States v. Kagama as follows: From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the executive, and by congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen. 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886); see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., “The People of the States Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies”: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981, 992 (1996) (“Indians regarded the duty to provide protection to a treaty partner . . . as a continuing legal and moral obligation. Changes in circumstance or the original bargaining positions of the parties were therefore irrelevant as far as Indians were concerned. . . . [A] treaty partner who had grown stronger over time was under an increased obligation of protection toward its now weaker partner.”).


295.  Today, as a result, “[o]f the 1.4 million acres that once constituted the Osage reservation, less than 0.04% remains in restricted tribal ownership.” Barbara Moschovidis, Osage Nation v. Irby: The Tenth Circuit Disregards Legal Precedent to Strip Osage County of Its Reservation Status, 36 Am. Indian L. Rev. 189, 189 (2011).

296.  See Jean Dennison, Colonial Entanglement: Constituting a Twenty-First Century Osage Nation 105 (2012) (noting that the Osage complained that their agency superintendent “was more greatly concerned about and favorable to the interests of big oil companies and men of large financial means and political influence than to the interests of the Osage people”); see also generally McAuliffe, supra note 255.

297.  See, e.g., Militia Called to Fight Crazy Snake’s Indians, LEWISTON DAILY SUN, Mar. 22, 1909, at 1; “King of Osages” is Convicted of Indian Murders, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Oct. 30, 1926, at 1; Government is Held Up in Osage Murder Quiz, BEND BULLETIN, Jan. 13, 1926, at 1.

298.  The Authors have represented the disenrollees in this dispute.
Since then, there has been an unbridled political divide between non-Filipino Nooksacks and Nooksacks with mixed Filipino-Nooksack ancestry. Adding further complexity to the Tribe’s member composition, Nooksacks were considered Canadian until 1973. As such, a member of the various American-Nooksack subgroups also likely descends from, or is enrolled with, one of several related Canadian First Nations today. Still other Nooksack members have been adopted from other American tribes or Canadian First Nations, and lack any Nooksack blood quantum. While the Filipino-Nooksacks maintain that they have just as much right to Nooksack membership as do the non-Filipino Nooksacks, the latter have claimed that the Filipino-Nooksacks are “large groups or families that have much weaker ties to Nooksack than the rest . . . who are currently enrolled.”

The disenrollment-fueled conflict came to a head on December 19, 2012, during a special meeting of the Nooksack Tribal Council. The topic to be discussed at this special meeting was the enrollment of certain Filipino-Nooksack children who had applied for enrollment. Because the children’s father was an enrolled Nooksack member, and because they possessed at least one-fourth Indian blood degree and were of Nooksack ancestry, the children should have been enrolled pursuant to the Nooksack Constitution. The Tribe’s Enrollment Office, however,

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301. See EVE DARIAN-SMITH, NEW CAPITALISTS 14 (2004) (“First Nations is the term most often used in reference to the indigenous peoples of Canada . . . .”).


306. As of 2012, the constitutional requirements for enrollment were as follows: The membership of the Nooksack Indian Tribe shall consist of: (a) All original Nooksack Public Domain allottees and their lineal descendants living on January 1, 1942; (b) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear on the official census roll of the tribe dated January 1, 1942 . . . ; (c) Lineal descendants of any enrolled member of the Nooksack Indian Tribe subsequent to January 1, 1942, provided such descendants possess at least one-fourth (1/4) degree Indian blood; . . . (h) Any persons who possess at least 1/4 Indian blood and who can prove Nooksack ancestry to
denied the childrens’ enrollment, citing “incomplete files” and “missing
documents.”

On January 8, 2013, the non-Filipino Tribal Council Chairperson met with
the rest of the Tribal Council to discuss new “information” allegedly obtained from
the BIA. According to the Chairperson, not only did the BIA lack any documents
or files that would support the Filipino-Nooksack children’s eligibility, but also that
“supporting documents and files” were missing from over 300 currently enrolled
Nooksack’s files—all 300-plus of whom are the same “family of mixed Filipino and
Indian descent” that the non-Filipino faction had been trying to quell since 1998.

On February 4, 2013, the Chairperson informed the Tribal Council that
Nooksack Tribal Enrollment Office had began the process of disenrolling all of the
Filipino-Nooksack members pursuant to the Tribe’s IRA constitution. On
February 12, 2013, the Chairperson ordered Tribal Council Secretary Rudy St.
Germain and Councilmember Michelle Roberts—both of whom are of Filipino-
Nooksack ancestry—to excuse themselves from an executive Tribal Council
session, as the topic of the meeting was their own disenrollment. During the
private executive session, the Tribal Council passed a resolution to disenroll the 306
Filipino-Nooksacks, known as “the Nooksack 306.”

any degree . . . . The tribal council shall, by ordinance, prescribe rules and
regulations governing involuntary loss of membership. The reasons for
such loss shall be limited exclusively to failure to meet the requirements
set forth for membership in this constitution . . . .


308. It is unclear why the Tribal Council met to discuss enrollment—the children
were already denied. In all likelihood, the plan to disenroll was already in the works, as the
dispute had been brewing for years.
309. Cabbera, supra note 299.
311. Id. at 9.
312. On March 6, 2013, the Chairperson sent an “open letter” to the Nooksack tribal
membership, regarding “the involuntary disenrollment of numerous members of the
Nooksack Tribe.” According to the letter:

The Nooksack Constitution grants the Council the power to disenroll
members if it is found that they do not meet the requirements of
membership . . . . Many of the 300 people who will be affected by this
action are individuals who you may know . . . . They will no longer be
qualified for tribal housing, medical facilities, treaty-protected fishing or
hunting rights, or any other rights reserved to Nooksack tribal members.

Letter from Robert Kelly, Jr., Chairperson, Nooksack Indian Tribe, to Tribal Membership
(Mar. 6, 2013) (on file with authors).

313. Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 58 St. Louis U. L.J. 937, 945, 981 (2014) (discussing the plight of the “Nooksack 306” generally); see also Cornwell, supra note 5 (same).
Nooksack Tribal Resolution No. 13-02 stated that “erroneous enrollments originated from lineal descendants of an original Nooksack Public Domain allottee.” According to the Resolution, none of the targeted Filipino-Nooksacks’ ancestors were “original Nooksack Public Domain allottee[s].” Additionally, the majority faction asserted that “each member who descended from” persons who were not lineal descendants to a public domain allottee and “claim[ed] right to membership through lineal descendancy” were subject to disenrollment.

On February 14, 2013, the Nooksack Tribal Council majority faction commenced issuance of a Notice of Intent to Disenroll (the “Notice”) to the Nooksack. The Notice informed disenrollees that, according to the Nooksack Tribal Code, there could be no review of the tribe’s disenrollment decision by court, or by any other type of independent third party—in 2005, the Tribe’s Enrollment Ordinance was modified to remove the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court to review the government’s disenrollment decision and require that a Nooksack applying for enrollment must trace a lineal descendent back to an “original Nooksack Public Domain allottee” or a “person[] of Indian blood whose name[] appear[s] on the official census roll of the Nooksack Tribe dated January 1, 1942.” That each targeted Filipino-Nooksack clearly met the requirements for enrollment, at the time of enrollment, was now not enough.

On March 1, 2013, the Nooksack Tribal Council majority faction passed a resolution calling for a general membership vote to delete the section of the Tribe’s constitution that allowed for membership of “[a]ny person who possesses at least one-fourth (1/4) degree Indian blood and who can prove Nooksack ancestry to any degree” On June 24, 2013, the Secretary of the Interior approved the constitutional amendment per the IRA. In addition, the Nooksack Tribal Council

314. Federal Complaint, supra note 305, at 10. It was not questioned that the targeted Filipino-Nooksacks were lineal descendants of an enrolled Nooksack. It just happened to be that the ancestor was one of the 170-plus who was not a public domain allottee and was not on the Tribe’s original roll. See St. Germain v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior at __, No. 13-0945, (W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2014) (expert opinion of Dr. Jay Miller, concluding that “Annie George-Mack-James . . . and her heirs are fully qualified to be enrolled Nooksack, as they have been for decades”); see also id. at ECF No. 5–4 (expert opinion of Dr. Bruce G. Miller, noting that the ancestor “regarded herself as fully Nooksack, and was taken to be so by others”).


316. Id.


318. Id. at 11.


320. St. Germain v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 13-0945 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2014). The requirements at that time were (1) enrolled parents; (2) possession of at least one-fourth Indian blood; and (3) Nooksack ancestry to any degree. Id.


322. Motion to Dismiss at 13, St. Germain v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 13-0945 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2014). The Nooksack disenrollees are currently litigating whether the amendment was approved without the legal review required by The Nooksack disenrollees
majority faction promulgated a new Title 65 of the Nooksack Tribal Code, titled “Nooksack Indian Tribe Conflict of Interest and Nepotism Code,” in order to prevent any of the Nooksack Tribe from participating in government.\textsuperscript{323} On January 20, 2014, the Nooksack Tribal Council majority faction passed a resolution to remove Secretary St. Germain and Councilwoman Roberts from their positions on the Tribal Council.\textsuperscript{324} The Nooksack Tribal Court upheld the two councilmembers’ removal from office by the faction, holding that “[t]he function of removal from office . . . is the very definition of an allegation that concerns the establishment and functions of the tribal government over which this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{325} Although Mr. St. Germain and Ms. Roberts were voted into office by the Nooksack membership to serve four-year terms, those terms were cut short by the majority faction—and to date, there has been no remedy for their removal.

On March 18, 2014, the targeted Nooksacks won their first victory, before the Nooksack Tribal Court of Appeals.\textsuperscript{327} In\textsuperscript{328} Roberts v. Kelly,\textsuperscript{328} a group of aggrieved Nooksacks challenged the Tribe’s Disenrollment Procedures\textsuperscript{329} by arguing that they “violate[d] the Nooksack Constitution in the manner [in which] they were enacted.”\textsuperscript{330} The court ruled that while the Nooksack Constitution granted the Tribal Council the “exclusive authority to prescribe rules and regulations governing involuntary loss of membership, provided those rules and regulations are adopted by ordinance,” this power was restricted by another provision of the

\textsuperscript{326} Nooksack Const., art. 5, §4.
\textsuperscript{327} The Nooksack Tribal Court of Appeals is a function of the Northwest Intertribal Court System (“NICS”). “NICS administers the court of appeals of each tribe served by NICS according to that tribe’s own codes, rules of procedure, and judicial eligibility criteria and appointments.” Appellate, NORTHWEST INTERTRIBAL COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nics.ws/appeal/appeal.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
\textsuperscript{330} Id. at 3.
Constitution that mandated that the “power to enact ordinances [was] subject to approval of the Secretary of the Interior.”331 Because the disenrollment procedures operated as a tribal ordinance (although deftly styled as “procedures”), but were disapproved by the Secretary of the Interior, they were not enforceable.332 This staved off the disenrollment and sent the majority faction back to the drawing board.

In January 2015, the Secretary of the Interior approved a Nooksack disenrollment ordinance promulgated by the Nooksack Tribal Council majority faction.333 It has been over two years since the Nooksack disenrollment crisis began, and despite the majority faction’s “fast-tracking the disenrollment process at nearly every turn,” the Nooksack 306 remain enrolled.334 But the Nooksack courts have thus far refused to make any decision on the constitutionality of the mass disenrollment, and instead have left the majority faction with unfettered decision-making power.

2. Analysis

The negative aspects of the IRA are evident in the Nooksack disenrollment crisis. One of the central thrusts of the IRA was that it did not limit or expand the definition of who is and is not a tribal member. Rather, the IRA shifted that legal inquiry towards a determination of who has the authority to ask and answer membership questions about disenrollment: “‘Who counts?’ turns into the question, ‘Sez who?’”335 At Nooksack, the Tribe’s Enrollment Ordinance was modified such that this determination, under tribal law at least, began and ended with the Tribal Council. Specifically, the provision stating that “[a]ctions of the Council to disenroll a tribal member shall be submitted to the superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for review and approval,”336 was replaced with: “The Tribal Council shall determine if the member is to be disenrolled. The decision of the Nooksack Tribal Council is final.”337 Thus, disenrollees are limited in the causes of action they may bring before the Tribal Court. While the Nooksack 306 have been able to delay disenrollment through challenging the manner in which the Tribal Council provides procedural due process, it may be only a matter of time until the prevailing Tribal Council majority faction, through overzealous trial and error, gets it right—and once that happens, there may be no way to challenge a disenrollment decision on the merits.

Under the IRA, tribal factions have essentially limitless authority to disenroll members via revisions to their tribal code, constitution, and court rules, such that no tribal member that is targeted for disenrollment is allowed a meaningful

331. Id.
332. Id. at 5.
334. Id.
335. Levinson, supra note 313, at 981.
chance to make his or her case for continued enrollment. As Professor Suzianne Paniter-Thorne has noted:

Fewer than half (approximately 275) of federally recognized tribes have any form of formal tribal court system. Rather, in some tribes the tribal leader is also the tribal judge and there is no written code. Even among those tribes that do have a formal court system, . . . the tribal court system may not provide for any review process. Indeed, in many tribes there is no judicial body with any oversight over membership decisions, an omission that essentially makes the enrollment committee’s decision unreviewable. In other tribes, the tribal council may be entrusted with reviewing tribal court decisions. To the extent the tribal council is involved in enrollment decisions, it is essentially reviewing its own rules or decisions. Moreover, even in those tribes where there is tribal court oversight, the tribal court and tribal council may be comprised of all or some of the same members. Where tribal council, enrollment council, and tribal courts are comprised of either the same people or of people all with the same interests, there is at least the appearance of a lack of independent oversight . . . . For instance, in his dissent in Santa Clara, Justice White highlighted this conflict by noting that “both [the] legislative and judicial powers are vested in the same body, the Pueblo Council . . . . To suggest that this tribal body is the ‘appropriate’ forum for the adjudication of alleged violations of the ICRA is to ignore both reality and Congress’ desire to provide a means of redress to Indians aggrieved by their tribal leaders.”

Disenrollment disputes also highlight the challenges that result when one tribal group splits off from the majority, otherwise known as “tribal factionalization.” As Thomas W. Cowger has noted, this is nothing new, as “tribal factionalization often made the operation of tribal governments problematic” and allows tribal leaders to advance their own political goals, including endless tenure. This dynamic has allowed some tribal leaders to capitalize on the confusion, to advance their own political goals, including endless tenure on tribal council or as tribal chairman.

338. See Reitman, supra note 58, at 819 (“[E]ffecting disenrollments by changing citizenship guidelines often clothes an otherwise actionable disenrollment in a veneer of legality.”).
340. See Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and United States Law in the Nineteenth Century 58–59 n.7 (1994) (noting that “[i]n response to federal pressure, internal disagreement spread within the tribes over a wide variety of issues, including the relationship between traditional tribal laws and new laws needed to accommodate the rapid social change occurring,” and that this caused a “process called ‘factionalization’”).
341. Id.
While some IRA constitutions have been amended to eliminate the blood quantum requirement, BIA-imposed tribal membership and disenrollment standards persist. Ties to the tribal community—even proven ancestral ties—withstanding, there are members and nonmembers; the ultimate determination of which is often dependent on arbitrary, antiquated, flawed, and often purposefully exploitive federal documents. Instead of taking traditional ideas of membership into account—ideas that help support tribal survival and cause tribal governments to reflect on their cultural values, this criterion, like blood quantum, merely encourages exclusion as an incentive to cut membership numbers and increase benefits to remaining members. Meanwhile, for the Nooksack, the entire mode of IRA governance superimposed upon the Tribe has almost entirely ceased to function as a result of the Nooksack 306 mass disenrollment controversy.

C. Disenrollment and the Effect of the Termination

Here, we discuss one tribal disenrollment dispute, fueled by federal termination policies, which has caused the tribe at issue to remain in constant turmoil for over 60 years.


343. See Dao, supra note 30 (noting that “[c]lan rivalries,” “political squabbles,” and “political vendettas or family feuds” that are “often triggers for disenrollment” today) (quoting Professor David Wilkins).

344. Recall prior to U.S. involvement in tribal membership, membership “was relatively fluid, and ancestry within the group was not always essential.” COHEN, supra note 20, at § 3.03. Under the IRA, membership was based upon ancestry, determined by federal documents—documents that are riddled with error, “both by accident and malicious intent of US or tribal officials.” Second Declaration of Gabriel S. Galanda at 10, Lomeli v. Kelly, No. 2013-CI-Cl-001 (Nooksack Tribal Ct. Mar. 29, 2013) (testimony of Dr. Jay Miller, Anthropologist, University of Washington).

345. Miller, supra note 74, at 341, 346 n.142.

346. See, e.g., Ralph Schwartz, Deming Levee Gets State Support, No Money from the Tribe, BELLINGHAM HERALD (Dec. 28, 2014), http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2014/12/28/4047754_deming-levee-gets-state-support.html?rh=1 (discussing how “the tribal council was too preoccupied with a controversial effort to disenroll hundreds of tribal members to properly consider funding [a] levee” that would protect the Nooksack Reservation from flooding: “Apparently, the internal strife of expelling tribal members brought all other government affairs to an extreme slowdown”).
1. Case Study: Northern Ute

In 1950, the Northern Utes were awarded $7.5 million from the federal government in compensation for the loss of tribal lands. At the insistence of the United States, the monies were used to make an initial $1,000 per-capita payment to Northern Ute members. Almost immediately, Northern Ute members became “dependent upon unearned income derived from land claims judgments.”

Over the next couple of years, tribal per-capita payments increased, the total per capita distributions between 1951 and 1959, totaled over $11,000 per member. As with the Osage and Creek Indians a half century before, tribal factionalization, and in turn mass disenrollment, rapidly commenced at Northern Ute.

A faction of supposed Northern Ute “full-bloods” immediately sought to have another group, the “mixed-bloods,” disenrolled from the Tribe. The BIA encouraged this action as the first step in terminating both groups from federal obligations. In 1954, at the insistence of the “full-bloods,” Congress determined that the criteria for Northern Ute membership was to include so-called “full” blood quantum: “one-half degree of Ute Indian blood and a total of Indian blood in excess of one-half, excepting those who become mixed-bloods by choice.” Roughly 500 “mixed-bloods” were instantly disenrolled from Northern Ute.

2. Analysis

Per-capita payments at Northern Ute increased over time and, in turn, membership criteria tightened further, per tribal law. Endless infighting and litigation ensued. Four decades later, a federal court concluded that the Tribe’s per-capita-driven membership criteria were issued in order to complete Congress’s goal.

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350. JORGENSEN, supra note 350, at 152.


353. JORGENSEN, supra note 350, at 152.

354. 25 U.S.C. § 677a(b) (2012); see also R. WARREN METCALF, TERMINATION’S LEGACY: THE DISCARDED INDIANS OF UTAH 181 (2002) (“The Ute Partition Act, passed in 1954 required three things, the first step called for the establishment of the tribal rolls to determine the exact number of members in the two groups.”).

355. Henderson, supra note 351, at 22.

356. Id.
of tribal termination, without actually terminating the Tribe. In *Chapoose v. Clark*, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found that “Congress intended that the blood quantum requirements . . . be used only . . . to separate the full-bloods and mixed-bloods so that the mixed-bloods could be terminated.” Indeed, higher per-capita payment to the “full-bloods,” and eventual termination of all Northern Utes, was what the federal government intended.

To this day, nearly 65 years after the Tribe’s inaugural per-capita payment, membership, and disenrollment issues plague Northern Utes. In addition, and despite decades of per-capita monies, 54% of Northern Ute families live in poverty and 40% of all adults residing on the Tribe’s reservation are unemployed. In addition, large tracts of Indian lands have passed into non-Indian hands, benefiting non-Indian business interests, trimming the federal budget, and pushing the full range of state jurisdiction (including taxing jurisdiction) into Indian Country. Disenrolled Northern Utes have been effectively forced to leave their ancestral land and move into mainstream American society; have become subject to state control without any federal restrictions or support; and special federal health, education, and general assistance for these members has ended. Congress’s goal of termination has largely been realized at Northern Ute, through disenrollment, without the federal government formally terminating the Tribe at all—through per-capita and disenrollment, the Northern Ute have self-terminated, and continue to do so.

D. Disenrollment in the Modern Era

Here, we provide one example of how federal policies have caused the disenrollment crisis to proliferate, even in this era of self-determination.

1. Case Study: Paskenta Disenrollment

Nowhere has been hit harder by the disenrollment epidemic than California. Since 1988, disenrollment has resulted in roughly a 10% drop in total

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359. Id. at 1034.
364. Id. at 139–40.
365. The Authors have represented the disenrollees in this dispute.
tribal membership statewide. And for each tribe that has disenrolled its own people, that tribe has lost anywhere between 10% to 50% of its total membership. The roughly 250-member Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians provides just one example of how dramatically these disenrollment disputes unfold when there are also large-stakes Indian-gaming facilities in the mix, and how the federal government stands on the sidelines despite rampant violations of federal law.

The Paskenta own and operate a 70,000 square-foot casino just off of the Interstate 5 corridor in Northern California that brings in hundreds of millions of dollars a year. In the summer of 2014, however, the casino’s operation was put in crisis through a dispute that had “all the elements of a Hollywood blockbuster”—allegedly, a private jet, gold bars, a cyber-attack, a former FBI agent as tribal treasurer, multi-million dollar embezzlement, a blood feud, death threats, guns for hire, and semi-automatic weapons. The dispute began, at least publicly, on April 12, 2014, at the Tribe’s annual meeting. There, the Paskenta Chairman diverged from the scheduled agenda and summarily suspended an elected member of the Tribal Council and began reading a prepared statement announcing that certain families, including the suspended tribal councilmember’s family, were not legally enrolled Paskenta.

As a result of this attempted action, near-violent chaos ensued, the Tribal Council Vice Chairperson adjourned the annual meeting, and local police were called to maintain the peace. After four tribal councilpersons and various tribal members left the meeting room, the Chairperson proceeded to: (1) allege that three of those four councilpersons had “abandoned” the annual meeting, creating vacancies pursuant to the Tribe’s constitution; (2) appoint new
councilpersons of his own liking; (3) raid the Tribe’s headquarters in the middle of the night, using armed casino guards to remove tribal property and files, and destroy tribal fixtures;376 (4) empower non-Indian casino management aligned with him to control the Tribe’s casino; and (5) cease gaming per-capita payments to the abandoned councilpersons and about 75 members of their families.377

Literally overnight, a tribal leadership dispute was born; two separate tribal council factions held “council” meetings, passed resolutions, and disclaimed the actions of the other.378 As the parties attempted to determine which leadership faction should govern the tribe, litigation would ensue in two separate courts, both claiming to be the Paskenta Tribal Court.379 Meanwhile, the Chairperson’s chosen casino management team used guards armed with semi-automatic rifles to keep the Original Tribal Council out of the casino and other tribal properties, including the tribe’s health clinic, and commenced suspension and disenrollment efforts against those Councilpersons and their families.380 A retired sheriff for neighboring Tehama County described the situation as follows:

It’s become very clear that laws are being broken and money is being mishandled at the Rolling Hills Casino, leaving the tribe in jeopardy of being robbed of millions of dollars, and potentially being forced to shut down their casino . . . . But frankly I’m even more concerned about the seriousness of the situation with regard to the safety of tribal members, the public, and employees. Weapons violations, millions of dollars at stake, and regulators being systematically and physically removed from their posts is a recipe for a violent altercation. What has become clear is that the Paskenta Tribe is under siege, completely

376. Id. at 6–15.
377. Id.; see also Toensing, supra note 373 (“[B]y mid-April Andrew Freeman and his faction, which includes some casino executives who are not tribal members, were in control of the casino.”).
out of control of its casino, and unless a federal agency steps in, this could truly turn violent.  

The Original Tribal Council urged the BIA to issue an advisory letter to interested parties and argued that the BIA must recognize and name the last undisputed officials. On April 15, 2014, the BIA issued a letter to local non-tribal law enforcement and to the Tribe’s bank, providing them with a BIA document listing the tribe’s “last Tribal Council of Record.” But the BIA disclaimed that it “does not get involved in internal tribal disputes” — even though it had previously done so in other similar disputes (i.e., the Creek and Osage Nations). The BIA’s caveat had the effect of rendering its letter meaningless.


382. While “it is well-established that ‘the ultimate determination of tribal governance must be left to tribal procedures,’ . . . [i]t is equally well-established . . . that ‘when an intra-tribal dispute has not been resolved and the [BIA] must deal with the tribe for government-to-government purposes, the Department may need to recognize certain individuals as tribal officials on an interim basis . . . ’” Alturas Indian Rancheria v. Acting Pac. Reg’l Dir., 54 IBIA 1, 8 (2011) (quoting Wasson v. W. Reg’l Dir., 42 IBIA 141, 158 (2006); George v. E. Reg’l Dir., 49 IBIA 164, 190 (2009)). When the latter occasion arises — when the BIA is forced to recognize certain individuals as tribal officials for government-to-government purposes — the rule is that the BIA must “recognize the last undisputed officials.” Id. Numerous cases reiterate and affirm this rule. See, e.g., id. at 186 (“The policy of recognizing particular individuals when necessary for government-to-government relations is normally applied ‘by recognizing the last undisputed officials.’”) (quoting Poe v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 43 IBIA 105, 112 (2006)); Rosales v. Sacramento Area Dir., 32 IBIA 158 (1998) (applying last uncontested election results). 


384. Id. 

385. See, e.g., In re Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litig., 340 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2003); Wasson v. Acting W. Reg’l Dir., 52 IBIA 353, 358 (2010). 

386. In addition, on April 21, 2014, the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) director of compliance wrote to the Chairperson’s faction, expressing concern “that the tribal government recognized by the BIA is not in control of the tribe’s gaming operation and remains excluded from the premises” and “that the gaming at the Casino is not being conducted by the tribe—that is, by the governmental authority recognized by the Secretary of the Interior—or by an entity licensed by the tribal government pursuant to NIGC regulations.” Toensing, supra note 373 (quotation omitted). “If true,” the NIGC wrote, “the federally recognized tribal government is being deprived of the sole proprietary interest in and responsibility for the gaming operation.” Id. However, this still was not enough to cause any outside governmental intercession because, according to local and state officials and other interested parties, neither the BIA nor the NIGC letters clearly recognized one faction or the other as “the Tribe.” See, e.g., Julie R. Johnson, Tribal Conflict Escalates, Casino Shutdown Attempted, CORNING OBSERVER (Jun. 9, 2014), http://www.appledemocrat.com/corning_observer/tribal-conflict-escalates-casino-shutdown-attempted/article_7aed8b94-f056-11e3-80dd-0017a43b2370.html (“The sheriff’s office said
With federal and local authorities sitting on the sidelines, the stakes were raised. Given the lack of action by any tribal or federal entity, the pre-April 12, 2014 Tribal Council “decided to take matters into [their] own hands” by causing a remote shutdown of the casino’s computer system. The Chairperson’s faction retaliated by publically accusing the Original Tribal Council of “embezzling millions from tribal accounts” and increased hostile “encounters between tribal members and belligerent hired armed guards” at the casino and elsewhere. Meanwhile, the Original Tribal Council continued to plead to the BIA, fearing that increased and continued violence would occur until the BIA, and in turn other outside law enforcement, intervened. On May 6, 2014, the BIA finally answered that Tribal Council’s pleas—by refusing to answer. The BIA wrote:

Previous decisions, or acknowledgments, concerning leadership disputes or identification of tribal officials may have been issued . . . however, recent [DOI] law reflects that the [BIA] is precluded from taking action on your request . . . . This Office recognizes that there are internal issues within the Tribe; however, . . . BIA lacks authority to intervene . . . as these issues are considered internal tribal matters and are to be resolved in a tribal forum, not by the [BIA].

in a press release, ‘the Tehama County Sheriff’s Office is dedicated to preserving public safety and has elected not to align itself with any particular group in this situation.’

388. Toensing, supra note 373.
389. Letter from Dale Risling, Deputy Regional Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Pacific Regional Office, to David Swearinger, et al. (May 6, 2014) (on file with authors). Likewise, the NIGC sat idle, despite its responsibility to ensure peace at Paskenta through enforcement of the IGRA. Sandra J. Ashton, The Role of the National Indian Gaming Commission in the Regulation of Tribal Gaming, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2003). By late May 2014, Ken Many Wounds, a former NIGC regional director, issued an investigatory report based on an independent investigation he had conducted at the Tribe’s casino, which concluded:

In all, based on what I witnessed and learned . . . I am surprised that the NIGC has not taken swift action to shut down the Rolling Hills Casino, or at least issued a Notice of Violation by now. I know past NIGC Chairman who issued closure orders based on a much lesser degree of gaming law violation than what I saw during my visit. I am also surprised by the rather nonchalant pace of the NIGC’s investigation, and the wholly improper lines of questioning; especially given the federal, state and tribal gaming law violations I saw from the casino floor and the potential for many more. I remain particularly astonished by the unprecedented show of force by armed guards currently on display at Rolling Hills Casino, and the palpable potential for violence, and the fact that this endangerment to the public has been allowed to continue by federal gaming regulators and other authorities for nearly nine weeks.

Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians’ Third Party Complaint at 12, State v. Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians, No. 14-1449, (E.D. Cal. Jun. 26, 2014). Mr. Many Wounds’ opinions were corroborated by the retired Tehama County sheriff, whose own report confirmed that “since April 12, 2014, armed guards were brought in . . . [T]hey carried pepper spray, Tasers,
On June 9, 2014—almost two months after the dispute began—an armed standoff erupted between the two factions involving roughly 30 police from each faction, some "bearing masks with rifles, . . . extended magazines, and a canine."390 The sheriff’s reports stated that there was "no indication that the stand-off will conclude at any time soon."391 Indeed, the Original Tribal Council indicated that "by and through its Tribal Police, [it] intend[ed] to . . . physically repossess and close Rolling Hills Casino."392 During the standoff, an employee of the Chairperson’s faction was arrested when he pulled a baton on a member of the Original Tribal Council.393 Other employees reportedly “pointed rifles at Sheriffs deputies and threatened to ‘send the dog’ on them.”394 In response, the BIA finally flipped course and issued an administrative cease and desist order, stating that the BIA recognized the Original Tribal Council and that it would continue to do so until the “internal dispute can be resolved by the Tribe, pursuant to the Tribe’s own governing documents and processes.”395 However, the order was immediately appealed by the

handguns, knives in boots and holsters, the K-9 unit had an AR-15 and the guards at the back of the building had AR-15s. . . . [T]he people in possession of the casino are willing to resort to violence to maintain the possession of the casino.” Id. at 11. Meanwhile, upon the Sheriff’s inquiry regarding whether the Tribe, through at least the Chairperson, “was running the casino,” a witness “stated that ‘he’s not in charge of anything and that [a non-Paskenta casino general manager] is running everything.’” Id. In other words, the Tribe was, as NIGA feared on April 15, 2014, still not in control of the casino and the gaming was not being conducted by the Tribe, in violation of the IGRA. Declaration of Vice Chairman David Swearinger, California v. Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians at 6–7, No. 14-1449 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 18, 2014). Yet the NIGC did nothing to remedy that problem. In addition, the Chairperson’s faction denied payment of gaming per-capita monies to the pre-April 12, 2014 Tribal Council and their families in violation of federal law, 25 CFR § 290.14 (2015); the NIGC also refused to take any enforcement action in that regard, feigning that “the tribal council is responsible for reviewing any disputes related to the distribution of gaming revenues.” Letter from Douglas Hatfield, Director of Compliance, Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, to David Swearinger, et al. (Oct. 6, 2014) (on file with authors).

391. Id. at 69.
392. Id. at 73.
393. Id. at 78.
394. Id.
Chairperson’s faction, and, in accordance with 25 C.F.R. 2.6(b), the effect of the order was stayed pending a determination on appeal. On June 17, 2014, the State of California, which too had sat on the sidelines for two months despite its own public safety obligations, filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The state alleged that the Tribe was in breach of its gaming compact (and therefore the IGRA) by failing to ensure the “physical safety of Gaming Operation patrons and employees, and any other person while in the Gaming Facility,” and by conducting “Class III gaming in a manner that endangers the public health, safety, or welfare.” The next day, the court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining both factions from: (1) “[a]ttempting to disturb, modify or otherwise change the circumstances currently in effect with respect to operation of the Rolling Hills Casino”; (2) “[d]eploying any armed personnel of any nature within 100 yards from the Casino”; and (3) “[p]ossessing, carrying, displaying, or otherwise having firearms on the Tribal Properties.”

On July 7, 2014, the parties announced that the governance dispute would be resolved through an election that “[a] mutually agreed upon CPA firm or forensic auditor will investigate all alleged financial improprieties and both parties will cooperate in good faith”; that no disenrollments would occur prior to the election; and that “the parties will agree upon a third party to address constitutional membership requirements.”


have cured its alleged breach of compact, and no imminent threat to the public health, safety, and welfare presently exists."

The Chairperson’s faction won the special election on September 14, 2014. Within a week of the election, and notwithstanding the settlement agreement, the new Tribal Council summarily suspended or disenrolled the four former councilpersons and their families—about 80 people altogether. Because the July 3, 2014 settlement agreement conferred jurisdiction to the American Arbitration Association for “the purpose of resolving disputes” and “improving the general welfare of the Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians,” those summary suspensions and disenrollments are currently the subject of arbitration. Otherwise, there would have been no forum for the families’ challenges to the disenrollment.

The Chairman has given no explanation for the sudden upheaval of the Paskenta tribal government on April 12, 2014 but according to the former Tribal Council Vice Chairperson “the rift was initiated by a handful of casino executive staff, who are not tribal members, who provided factually incorrect and incomplete information to the tribal Chairperson, which caused him to take actions based on the faulty information.” Ironically, the one councilmember whose family was chiefly targeted for disenrollment—Leslie Lohse, the National Congress of American Indians Pacific Region Area vice-president and the BIA’s Central California Agency Policy Committee chairperson—foresaw the impact that IGRA and the Tribe’s gaming operations would have on Paskenta membership and identity roughly ten years earlier. In a 2004 statement to Congress, Ms. Lohse stated:

IGRA was written to support Tribal sovereignty, self-determination and growth. Instead, it is being used to degrade and detract from our Tribal Governments. As deals are cut, revisionist historians re-write our history, and profit-driven investors lure our Tribal Governments, our Tribal Nations . . . will continue to lose our identity . . . Tribes are willingly signing and attesting to documents that will forever change our history and perhaps cause great damage to the future of Native Americans, all for the “projected profits” put before us by outside developers and investors.

404. Id.
405. Id.
Indeed, non-Indians and other outsiders—including casino managers, lawyers, lobbyists, consultants, and security companies—were the primary beneficiaries of the disenrollment saga at Paskenta, apparently to the tune of “millions in unrecoverable lost revenue and legal fees.”

2. Analysis

In contrast to the Nooksack disenrollment dispute discussed above, the Paskenta dispute appears to only be marginally related to enrollment eligibility, having much more to do with control of, and unfettered benefit from, the Tribe’s very lucrative casino. In addition, non-Indian control appeared to play a significant role at Paskenta. Indeed, there appears to be a trend, particularly in California—where small tribes and large casino revenues proliferate—of non-Indian interests taking the following steps to directly benefit from tribal casinos: (1) creating a disenrollment dispute; (2) using the disenrollment dispute as a proxy for a political takeover via recall, election, or hostile takeover; (3) exerting control over a tribe’s casino and other cash-generating enterprises—by violent force if necessary—and seizing the gaming money to pay the provocateur non-Indian attorneys, casino managers, and militia; and (4) issuing press releases speaking of “disenrollment,” “tribal factions,” and “embezzlement” as to legitimize the takeover in the eyes of the remaining membership and BIA officials, who generally look for any excuse to perform their jobs with “indifference to tribes.”

Of course, small tribes, coupled with large per-capita checks, have also incentivized those in control to shrink the pool of recipients so that each member

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411. See e.g., S. Rep. No. 109-325, at 59 (2006) (“We do a recall, election and take over. Let’s discuss. E-mail from Jack Abramoff to associate Jon van Horne, February 14, 2002.”).

412. See id. at 60 n.6 (e-mail between Jack Abramoff, Greenberg Traurig, and Michael Scanlon, Capitol Campaign Strategies, where Abramoff advises, “We’re charging these guys up the wazoo . . . . Make sure you bill your hours like a demon. Almost no one else is billing this client yet, so there is plenty of room. You should be able to qualify for a hefty bonus just on this one”).

still standing will have a larger piece of the pie. While efforts to correct membership errors made by previous generations or the federal government were perhaps sincere, according to a recent study published by the University of Arizona’s Native Nations Institute and the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, gaming per-capita distributions have played a significant part in the IGRA-era disenrollment disputes. Some scholars have even suggested that the IGRA’s allowance of per-capita payments was intended to bring about membership disputes. At minimum, when gaming tribes began distributing large per-capita payments, followed by unprecedented disenrollment actions, those tribes’ actions “should probably be regarded with a degree of skepticism.”

While, the IGRA did impose upon tribes a “requirement to secure federal approval for any plan to distribute gaming revenues on a per-capita basis to members, presumably to prevent political favoritism or corruption,” this has not always worked. Per-capita payments are often outcome determinative in tribal elections, especially amidst leadership or membership disputes. A common ploy is to schedule the disbursement of per-capita checks to coincide with tribal election voting.

Certain tribes’ irresponsible use of per-capita payments even caused Senator John McCain to propose an amendment to the IGRA in 2006 that would

414. See Laughlin, supra note 25, at 110–11 (“With so much money flowing into these tribes . . . membership issues have increasingly come to the forefront as individuals clamor for a piece of the gaming revenue pie.”).

415. See Dao, supra note 30 (“Tribal governments universally deny that greed or power is motivating disenrollment, saying they are simply upholding membership rules established in their constitutions.”).

416. See Stephen Cornell, et al., Per Capita Distributions of American Indian Tribal Revenues: A Preliminary Discussion of Policy Considerations 4 (2007), available at https://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/JOPNAAs/2007_CORNELL_etal_per_capita_distributions.pdf (“As the monies at stake have grown, so have disputes over tribal citizenship, with some nations removing people from the tribal rolls . . . . Such actions spawn politically intense, internally destructive, and costly conflicts . . . .”); see also Reitman, supra note 58, at 849 (“[T]here appears to be at least a rough correlation between gaming and membership abuses.”).

417. See Laughlin, supra note 25, at 101 (“Although the federal government may not have enacted express terms of disenrollment, it is undeniable that Congress has influenced tribal membership criteria through the enactment of the IGRA.”).

418. Reitman, supra note 58, at 817.


have required federal oversight of a “reasonable method of providing for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and the members of the Indian tribes.” While tribes were rightly outraged by Senator McCain’s proposed encroachment upon tribal sovereignty, tribes were also put on notice that federal decision-makers are not afraid to act on tribes’ improper use of per-capita dollars. Indeed, money-driven membership disputes and related civil rights violations by some tribes continue to provide federal lawmakers, who are already critical of tribal sovereignty, with ample reason to abrogate the self-governance rights of all tribes.

As federal deference to tribal control of disenrollment determinations has increased, so has intratribal violence. In 2010, Janice R. McRae hypothesized that, “[a]s the disenrolled tribal members experience an abrogation of identity and recognition, it is apparent that such could elicit aggressive behavior as a reflection of their frustration.” As we have seen, this is not a new phenomenon. Recall the Osage headrights that led to “conflict and violence within the Tribe.” The violence at Paskenta is the result of the same federal policy. And, what is more, this type of intratribal violence is proliferating.

Unfortunately, federal agencies, courts, or any other modes of outside law enforcement, usually will not intercede until violence occurs. For example, in California v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians, the State of California sued to enjoin operation of the casino pursuant to the Chukchansi Tribe’s gaming compact, which mandated that the Tribe not “conduct Class III gaming in a manner that endangers the public health, safety, or welfare.”

According to the court:

[T]he parties’ inability to resolve their ongoing intra-tribal dispute over Tribal governance indicates that the underlying impetus for the armed conflict has yet to dissipate . . . . [T]he public safety issue that has injected a Federal Court into business generally delegated by law to the Indian Tribes still exists. As such, the Court finds that the public health and safety danger would continue to exist if the Casino were to be reopened at this time . . . . [A] group of individuals

426. FIXICO, supra note 242.
427. Smith, supra note 16.
attempted an armed take over of the Casino through the use of violence and intimidation. This act was illegal in the eyes of any lawful body, and constituted the worst sort of street injustice.  

Legal scholars echo this sentiment. As Professor Barker has noted, the effects of this newest disenrollment surge are more than superficial in that what makes all of this tribal “greed and corruption so troubled and troubling is the way that . . . tribes throughout the country have rationalized the disenrollments of historically affiliated families on the grounds of exercising their legal rights to sovereignty and self-government as not only legally absolute and unchallengeable but as culturally integral.” But this is not true sovereignty—it “is a sovereignty . . . inflicted through racialized notions of Native authenticity and perpetuate[s] stereotypical notions . . . in order to dismiss both public scrutiny and internal accountability of their actions as anti-Indian and anti-tribal sovereignty.”

Of course, it did not have to be this way. That the authority to make intratribal disenrollment determinations was “delegated by law to the Indian Tribes” via federal regulations and policies, is simply a byproduct of the assimilation and termination policies of yesteryear—policies that have now spiraled out of control. As noted above, as late as 1988, the DOI concluded that it had “broad and possibly nonreviewable authority to disapprove or withhold approval . . . regarding membership.” Because the DOI and its BIA abruptly removed themselves from this arena, this means that they won’t—not that they can’t—make these determinations as a matter of federal policy. Due to this vacuous magic, Indian country continues to suffer.

429. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
430. BARKER, supra note 22, at 178.
433. Brownell, supra note 142 (internal quotation omitted).
434. The NIGC, too, has generally taken a similar hands-off policy, also to the detriment of Indian gaming interests. The Authors have written on this topic elsewhere. See e.g., Gabriel Galanda & Ryan Dreveskracht, The Bay Mills Buck Stops With NIGC, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 6, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/
III. MASS TRIBAL DIENROLLMENT AT A CRITICAL POINT

Throughout U.S. history, disenrollment has proven to cause the following harms: (1) the perpetuation of federal policies that mandate an arbitrary, aberrant, and forced biological division between Indians and non-Indians, to the detriment of the former; (2) assimilation and the loss of the tribal land base and related Indian cultural identity; (3) wholesale termination of the federal–tribal relationship; (4) a lack of redress to Indians aggrieved by their tribal leaders; (5) intra-tribal factionalization; (6) Indian-on-Indian violence; and (7) disregard of the federal fiduciary duty.

It is time to find a cure to the disenrollment epidemic. Indeed, at this point, the very existence of tribal sovereignty has become endangered as a result of disenrollment. As noted by Eric Reitman, “if the basis of sovereignty is the consent of the governed, no popular sovereign can long endure the derogation of citizenship rights absent an external force to maintain order or rebalance the system.” Where citizenship abuses are habitually irremediable, tribal governance must either self-terminate or adopt some form of government outside of the realm of the popular sovereign. To a large extent, therefore, the sovereign that allows the destruction of citizenship rights also permits the diminution of its own power. And where the sovereign itself causes the abuses, seeking to hush dissidents and magnify its own clout, it triggers a vicious cycle of ever weakening sovereignty which, if left unrestrained, will ultimately discredit the polity. Membership is the floor for a set of citizen rights, but it cannot be a null set. Any polity that fails to deliver security against forcible expulsion and subjugation, even if it never commences the actions, “is something less than a republic, and, at least arguably, something less than sovereign.”


436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. Because tribes currently lack jurisdiction over non-Indians in many contexts, see, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), disenrollment also subtracts from the ability of a tribe to assert jurisdiction. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Cherokee Nation: Underhanded Racial Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racial-justice/cherokee-nation-underhanded-racial-politics (arguing that “[a]n Indian tribe is a group of individual Indians who are linked by geography, culture, politics and ancestry” who practice “weak-form tribal sovereignty” via their “power to define membership” and that if a tribe wishes to “develop into a nation” it must “exercise[]
What should be clear by this point is that disenrollment—as opposed to setting limits on enrollment—is not an exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty. The federal government itself has explicitly and repeatedly recognized this principle, even into the modern era. Instead, disenrollment is an exercise of outdated and archaic federal policies that were intended to destroy tribal sovereignty—to have it replaced by a “definition of sovereignty that . . . replicat[es] many of the kinds of abuses we once fairly accused the United States of engaging in.”

Tribal sovereignty is “immersed in historic indigenous values” that “bind a community together”; it “consist[s] more of continued cultural integrity than of political powers,” and “revolves around the manner in which traditions are developed, sustained, and transformed to confront new conditions” and “involves most of all a strong sense of community discipline.” Tribal sovereignty utilizes “peace-making, mediation, restitution and compensation to resolve the inevitable disputes that occasionally ar[i]se,” and is founded in “spiritual values [and] kinship systems . . . that enabled each Native nation, and the individuals, families, and clans constituting those nations, to generally rest assured in their collective and personal identities and not have to wonder about ‘who’ they are.”

Disenrollment is the antithesis of tribal sovereignty. Disenrollment is based upon federal principles intended to terminate American Indians’ values and principles, incentivize the solidification of economic and political clout, and to winnow out those who disapprove of the direction taken by individuals or subgroups aligned with the federal government. Federal per-capita, termination (e.g. Osage, Creek, and Northern Ute), IRA (e.g. Nooksack), and “hands-off” (e.g. Paskenta) policies and practices do not support tribal sovereignty. These modes are all creations of the federal government, which have disserved tribal governments for the last 150 years. A collaborative solution to the modern tribal disenrollment crisis is greatly needed.

a robust form of sovereignty over its territory and all people within its territory,” something that disenrollment prohibits).

Beck v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 8 IBIA 210, 1980 WL 26409 (1980) (noting that the BIA “has been delegated the task of deciding disenrollment appeals”); Alaska Native Disenrollment Appeals of: James Edward Scott, Sr. & Robert Charles Scott, 7 IBIA 157, 1979 WL 21359 (1979) (determining that the BIA, and the IBIA have authority to decide “Alaskan Native disenrollment appeals on an ad hoc basis”).


444. Id. at 328.


446. Id.

447. Wilkins, supra note 443, at 330.

448. Id. at 329.

449. Id. at 335.
A. Lack of a Current Remedy

1. Federal Courts

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez ‘is generally employed as the starting point for any contemporary tribal citizenship rights analysis.’ Santa Clara Pueblo concerned whether the ICRA provided a federal cause of action when a “tribe’s right to define its own membership” conflicts with an individual’s right to be protected from sexual discrimination. The Court held that these two ideals may indeed conflict, but that the ICRA does not create a federal cause of action for habeas corpus unless a tribal government’s “discriminatory internal restrictions on their members” place a “restriction[] on liberty resulting from a criminal conviction.” Yet despite the rather narrow holding in Santa Clara Pueblo, the meaning of the case has mushroomed.

Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians held that permanent banishment as a punitive sanction qualified as such a restriction on liberty because “Congress could not have intended to permit a tribe to circumvent ICRA’s habeas provision by permanently banishing, rather than imprisoning, members ‘convicted’” of a crime. Since Poodry, tribal lawyers have been clever enough to avoid disenrollment-related castigations that outright “banish.” In Tavares v. Whitehouse, for instance, the court held that if a tribe permanently disenrolls its members, excluding them from some tribal facilities, but not necessarily all, “those members have not suffered a sufficiently severe restraint on liberty to constitute detention and invoke federal habeas jurisdiction under ICRA.”

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450. Reitman, supra note 58, at 851.
454. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
455. 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996).
456. Id. at 895.
457. Amidst the disenrollment epidemic, there is an alarming trend of tribal lawyer-catalyzed disenrollment efforts, which raises various questions of tribal lawyer ethics and morality. As one of the Authors has previously argued:
When lawyers advocate, cause or facilitate any disenrollment proceeding that lacks a good faith basis in law and fact, they are violating ethical rules or norms—and acting immorally . . . . Tribal legal counsel’s most frequent claim of “erroneous enrollment” as the basis for jettisoning unpopular or dissident Tribal members, typically lack [such] good faith basis . . . . Even more egregious are lawyer-advised disenrollment proceedings that are designed to strengthen a Tribal Council faction’s ability to control Tribal assets and remain in power.

Galanda, supra note 410.
What is important to note about Santa Clara Pueblo, Poodry, and Tavares is that they are jurisdictional decisions—i.e., “wholly separable from the merits of the underlying litigation.”\(^{460}\) The fact that the underlying litigation in these cases involves “membership disputes” should be of no import. The courts did not rule that “[f]ederal courts have no jurisdiction to hear tribal membership disputes”\(^{461}\)—they simply held that the ICRA did not create a cause of action for habeas corpus when something less than a restriction on liberty resulting from a criminal conviction is involved. The Santa Clara Pueblo fiction must cease to be told.

2. State Courts

It is well established that “[s]tates may not assert jurisdiction over tribes without congressional approval.”\(^ {462}\) However, Public Law 280 granted certain states, such as California, “jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action.”\(^{463}\) “The primary concern of Congress in enacting Public Law 280,” however, “was with the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.”\(^{464}\) Accordingly, Public Law 280 allowed state courts to enforce state criminal laws with respect to offenses committed either by or against Indians on Indian land. With respect to the grant of civil jurisdiction, while acknowledging that the legislative history of Public Law 280 reflects a “virtual absence of expression of congressional policy or intent,” it has held that the statute was intended to confer federal jurisdiction upon states where “private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens” was involved.\(^{465}\) Its effect, therefore, was “to grant jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court.”\(^{466}\) But Public Law 280 clearly did not confer state “jurisdiction over the tribes themselves.”\(^{467}\) Thus, because enrollment disputes are not “private legal dispute[s] between reservation Indians, but rather go[] to the heart of tribal sovereignty,” state courts claim to have no jurisdiction to adjudicate them.\(^{468}\)


\(^{462}\) Aroostook Band of Micmacs v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 41, 71 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reserv. v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 891 (1986) (“[I]n the absence of federal authorization, tribal immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty, is privileged from diminution by the States.”).

\(^{463}\) Aroostook Band of Micmacs, 484 F.3d at 52 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a)).


\(^{465}\) Id. at 381, 383.

\(^{466}\) Id. at 385.

\(^{467}\) Id. at 389.

3. Tribal Courts

The majority of tribal constitutions “explicitly authorize involuntary expatriation without securing for citizens any countervailing rights.” To the extent that tribal governments even have an independent judiciary—again many do not—the authority to adjudicate disenrollment disputes must be delegated by tribal law, along with a corresponding waiver of sovereign immunity or a common law directive akin to the *Ex parte Young* fiction. And even when jurisdiction is conferred in this manner, there is no means to enforce a court’s decision unless the tribal council—often the governmental body that is compelling the disenrollment action in the first place—orders to do so itself. In addition, the tribal council may interfere by making procedural changes to the law—changing the rules of the game as its being played—or even removing judges who make decisions that it is unhappy with. And on a practical note, many tribal judges “are more interested in


470. *See* Max Minzner, *Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and Outside Indian Country*, 6 Nev. L.J. 89, 109 (2005) (noting that some “tribes have blended the executive and judicial arms, with the tribal council serving as the highest court of appeals,” while “[o]ther tribes completely lack an appellate mechanism.”).

471. *See* Matthew L.M. Fletcher, *California v. Cabazon Band: A Quarter-Century of Complex, Litigious Self-Determination*, FED. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 50, 53 (“[California gaming] tribes usually do not have a tribal court system, and federal courts generally do not have jurisdiction over tribal membership claims. Therefore, assuming these Indians have lost their membership in the tribe illegitimately, they have little recourse.”).

472. *See, e.g.*, Lomeli v. Kelly, No. 2013-CI-APL-002, 12 NICS App. 1 (Nooksack Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2014). *Ex parte Young* creates an exception to tribal sovereign immunity, described by the Ho-Chunk Tribal Court as follows:

> The principle of sovereign immunity exists primarily to protect the public treasury from lawsuits seeking damages. It does not prevent people from suing the . . . government to enforce their rights . . . . Essentially, the plaintiff seeks to affect the future actions of the official or employee in an effort to avoid a continuing violation of the law. A plaintiff will typically request injunctive relief against the official or employee entrusted with implementing an allegedly illegal statutory provision.

*Kirkwood v. Decorah*, No. 04-33, 2005 WL 6161103, at *13 (Ho-Chunk Tribal Ct., Feb. 11, 2005) (citation and quotation omitted). As noted by the leading treatise: “the doctrine of *Ex parte Young* is indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law.” Wright & Miller, *Ex Parte Young*, in 17A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4231 (3d ed. 2013).

473. MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007).

474. *See e.g.*, *supra* notes 335–37 and accompanying text.

475. *See e.g.*, Pura v. Quinault Housing Authority, No. CV-12-002, at 4-5 (Quinault Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013) (two trial court judges removed after making rulings adverse to the tribe); Longie v. Pearson, 210 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 2000) (tribal court judge “complaining that, pursuant to a Council resolution, he was illegally removed from his position as Chief Judge in violation of tribal law, the Tribe's constitution, and federal law” after making a decision adverse to the tribe); Lewis v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, No. 12-8073 (D. Ariz. Jul. 6, 2012) (Tribal Council Resolution removing a tribal court judge after making a decision adverse to the Tribe); Robert Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, *Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Court*, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287,
implementing policies—against domestic violence, for example—than providing due process and a level playing field for both parties.\textsuperscript{476}

This is not to say that tribal courts are always insufficient. Indeed, numerous disenrollment battles have been waged and won in a tribal tribunal.\textsuperscript{477} But the point remains that, globally speaking, tribal courts only provide a solution to those tribes that are already acting as responsible governments—they do not provide disenrollees a comprehensive remedy.\textsuperscript{478}

4. International Forums

Without international tribunals demanding that tribal governments be accountable, the disenrollment crisis will reach a boiling point, and the principles of tribal self-government will be legally dismantled.\textsuperscript{479} As described by Attorneys Jana M. Bergera and Paula M. Fisher:

[T]here is no relief from the [U.S. government], which claims its hands are tied despite the trust oversight duties that are owed to tribal people. The federal courts and state courts will not enter this arena of dispute and where there are no tribal courts, there is no place for justice. This is the modern-day version of the termination era come back to plague tribal people. Now tribal governments are destroying their own tribal communities by disavowing their own grandparents, parents, sisters, and brothers. In many instances, there is nothing that can be done legally to stop this result.\textsuperscript{480}

318 (1998) (discussing removal of tribal court judges at White Mountain Apache Tribe and the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs); \textit{but see} Kirke Kickingbird, \textit{Striving for the Independence of Native American Tribal Courts}, 36 Hum. Rts. 16, 19–20 (2009) (noting improvement on this front in more recent years). This is not to imply that tribes taking this action is the norm—indeed, it is very small minority of tribes that take this action. A very large majority of tribes have independent judiciaries and keep them that way—even if accomplished by way of the judiciary itself. \textit{See}, e.g., White v. Porch Band of Creek Indians, No. SC-10-02 (Porch Band of Creek Indians Tribal S. Ct. Apr. 5, 2011); White v. Porch Band of Creek Indians, No. SC-12-01 (Porch Band of Creek Indians Tribal S. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). In \textit{Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians Tribal Council v. Lac Vieux Desert Band Tribal Police}, Nos. 10-CV-79 to 82 (Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2010), a trial court judge even ordered the jailering of the entire tribal council for failure to comply with a court order in a tribal election dispute.

476. Lewis III, \textit{supra} note 5, at 10.
478. Lewis, \textit{supra} note 5, at 10.
479. Diamond, \textit{supra} note 30, at 47.
Generally, when there is no domestic forum to litigate these types of disputes, international forums are evoked to provide the necessary relief.\(^{481}\)

The problem with appeal to international forums is two-fold. First, a party cannot reach an international forum unless the party first exhausts all domestic remedies, including a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.\(^{482}\) This requirement has the potential to cost a party inordinate amounts of money—which bankrupt disenrollees, in particular, do not have—and can take ten years or more to fully and finally litigate to exhaustion.\(^{483}\) This means that, by the time a disenrolled is able to bring suit in an international forum it will be too late; the member will be long past disenrolled and they will have already suffered irreparable harm.

Second, even if a disenrollee obtains a “remedy” internationally, the offending tribe is not required to honor it. Based on the public international law doctrine of sovereign immunity, “a sovereign’s immunity is extraterritorial and absolute.”\(^{484}\) When federal, state, or foreign sovereign immunity is at issue, domestic “courts look at whether the sovereign has waived its immunity (or otherwise consented to suit) or Congress has abrogated it.”\(^{485}\) This same rule applies to tribal sovereign immunity because Congress has not waived tribal immunity in this regard.\(^{486}\) Unless and until Congress acts, or a disenrolling tribe voluntarily waives its immunity, domestic enforcement of any ruling rendered by these tribunals will be largely unattainable.


\(^{482}\) See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law.” (quoting Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 26 (Mar. 29))).

\(^{483}\) See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 Award, ¶ 54, (2003) (refusing to analyze a petitioner’s legal claims because in failing to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the petitioner did not exhaust his domestic remedies).

\(^{484}\) Adriene Hill, *How Much Does a Big Supreme Court Case Like Gay Marriage Cost?*, MARKETPLACE ECON. (Mar. 25, 2013, 1:03 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/how-much-does-big-supreme-court-case-gay-marriage-cost (estimating that the cost of bringing a case before the U.S. Supreme Court is at least $250,000 and, more likely, millions of dollars).


\(^{488}\) Id.

\(^{489}\) Id.
As discussed above, there is otherwise a lack of domestic remedies. Neither federal nor state courts possess subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the disputes, and many tribal courts—if they exist—are hamstrung by tribal politics. Both Congress and the executive branch, including the Secretary of the Interior and his BIA, have recently taken a hands-off approach.

B. Finding a Remedy

In this subsection, we canvas the various options proposed to help end the disenrollment crisis. We submit that existing federal permissiveness allows tribal governments to abuse their power, subjecting individual Indians to appalling restraints on their liberty, free speech, and political participation. Legal scholars concur: the federal government has a duty to curb that power. This may well require congressional intervention, as has been proposed by numerous Indian law scholars. But especially given that a majority of bills in Congress do not pass and that the current Congress is infamously divided, dysfunctional, and unable to enact even the most pressing legislation, we also discuss less drastic routes.

1. Tribal Responsibility

Ultimately, it is up to tribal governments put an end to the disenrollment crisis as a matter of responsible governance. It took the American Civil War—and roughly 750,000 deaths—for the United States to determine, as a matter of federal law, who has a right to participate in the American political process, how that right is to be determined, and whether or not that right can be removed. The process of making this determination took hundreds of years. In the end, the U.S. government resolved that, while it certainly retained its formal authority, as a sovereign, “to determine who is, and who is not, a citizen, . . . it does not have sufficient authority—or perhaps even raw power—to expel those who ‘don’t count’ as official members of the American community.”

Indian country is at a critical juncture. As Professor Matthew L.M. Fletcher put it: “American Indian tribes will each face decisions about how to define themselves in coming decades. Eventually, each tribe’s decision will determine

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490. Reitman, supra note 58, at 799.
491. Id. at 800.
492. See id. at 801 (“It is up to Congress to determine whether determine whether [a tribal membership] revolution will take the form of a series of violent uprisings or a bloodless sea change in the extent to which tribes are permitted to retain control over their membership.”); Smith, supra note 16.
494. Levinson, supra note 313, at 986.
495. Id. at 987.
496. See Stacy L. Leeds & Erin S. Shirl, Whose Sovereignty? Tribal Citizenship, Federal Indian Law, and Globalization, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 89, 102 (2014) (”[T]ribes must recognize that the eyes of the world are watching. They must recognize that there are generally accepted international norms with which sovereigns must be willing to comply.”).
whether that tribe will develop into a nation or remain a tribe." Nations, as opposed to tribes, do not concern themselves with force-fed notions of membership, rolls, or monthly dues—nations do not function as private culture clubs. Modern states provide for the “automatic acquisition of citizenship status at birth,” and the right to retain citizenship indefinitely once it has been conferred. If tribes wish to be treated as nations, they must begin to act like it. The Federated Indians of Graton Rancheria, for instance, have done just that. In April of 2013—on the heels of opening the Bay Area’s largest casino, with projected profits at $418 million annually—the Graton tribe revised its constitution to prohibit disenrollment. According to Graton’s Chairperson Greg Sarris: “We saw the money coming, . . . We saw the changes coming. We saw the challenges and we said, ‘Let’s do something that could prohibit disenrollments in our tribe.’”

Likewise, the Passamaquoddy Tribe of the Pleasant Point Reservation amended its constitution to proclaim that “the government of the Pleasant Point Reservation shall have no power of banishment over tribal members.” One of the Passamaquoddy authors of that constitutional amendment essentially explained the law as being one intended to disallow disenrollment: “We felt that . . . we had to do this. It wouldn’t be right for us to say we have the power to decide who no longer is one of us.”

Certainly, tribal constitutional reform on a more general level provides numerous avenues for improvement. Changes that protect members’ basic rights, such as guaranteed participation in tribal elections, the right to receive tribal services and benefits, the right to be free from arbitrary and capricious government actions,

497. Fletcher, supra note 264.
498. See Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1275, 1293 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court has recently “perceived the functions of a tribe serving no greater purpose than that of a private club or organization” in that “like the Boy Scouts of America, tribes may only enact and enforce rules for members who consent to the rules of the ‘club’”). For the difference between “tribes” and “nations” as the terms are used by Indian law scholars, see generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1 (2012).
500. Seelau, supra note 29.
502. Id. Unfortunately, disenrollment remains taboo amongst tribal leaders nationally. See Galanda, supra note 410 (“Tribal leadership and disenrollment disputes are taboo in forums like the National Congress of American Indians and National Indian Gaming Association.”).
503. Kunesh, supra note 61, at 111 (quotation omitted).
504. Id.
and a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in a tribal forum when these rights are contravened, are just a few examples of these improvements.\textsuperscript{505}

To ensure that any reform is effective, any changes to tribal law or policy should address the following:

- **Stability.** Regulations and rules should not be allowed to change frequently, and if by chance they do need to be changed, they must be changed only by prescribed procedures and in limited scope.\textsuperscript{506}

- **Protection from political interference.** Any disenrollment determination should be made by an independent tribal office or entity; one not beholden to the tribal council. Establishing a separate corporation to manage economic development matters and having a board of directors that is accountable to the tribal council or another arm of the tribe, such as an economic development board, will also help to ensure that gaming revenue and disenrollment remain completely separate.\textsuperscript{507}

- **Reliability.** Whatever institution is set up to manage disenrollment issues should be governed by rules that are extant, effective, respected, and reduce uncertainty about the future of the tribe.\textsuperscript{508}

- **A dispute resolution mechanism.** As succinctly described by Attorney Brendan Ludwick, “[P]erhaps most important [as] an effective safeguard against tribal disenrollment is an independent tribal authority that has the power to review . . . enrollment actions.”\textsuperscript{509} Although this power may be conferred to an appointed or elected committee, comprehensive oversight

\textsuperscript{505} See Lewis, supra, at 13 (“The biggest threat to tribal sovereignty is failure to provide an adequate remedy in tribal court and failure to hold tribal officials accountable.”). In addition, if the tribe wishes to entrust disenrollment decisions to an outside forum (and at the same time utilize federal resources instead of its own), a constitutional disenrollment scheme that consents to federal review under 25 C.F.R. § 62.4(a) also affords additional protection for the disenrollee.

\textsuperscript{506} See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 23 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007) (“Governing institutions must be stable. That is, the rules don’t change frequently or easily, and when they do change, they change according to prescribed and reliable procedures.”).

\textsuperscript{507} See Brendan Ludwick, The Scope of Federal Authority over Tribal Membership Disputes and the Problem of Disenrollment, 51 FED. L. 37, 44 (2004) (“To the extent that elected officials do not directly benefit materially from a tribe’s business activities, they will be more likely to represent the broader interests of the tribe.”) (citing Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 925 (2003)).

\textsuperscript{508} Kenneth Grant & Jonathan Taylor, Managing the Boundary Between Business and Politics: Strategies for Improving the Chances for Success in Tribally Owned Enterprises, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 506, at 182. Grant and Taylor have also suggested the following: well-designated checks and balances, clear and predictable rules, staggered terms, civil service professionalism, and independent dispute-resolution mechanisms. Id. at 181–83.

\textsuperscript{509} Ludwick, supra note 507.
will likely find greater security in a tribal court, as long as the tribal constitution vests co-equal powers to the judiciary.\textsuperscript{510} To be effectual, these tribal courts must be authorized to decide enrollment disputes and to autonomously appraise elected officials’ actions.\textsuperscript{511}

Tribes taking responsibility for the disenrollment crisis is the preferred route for at least two reasons. First, “[f]or too long the tribes have suffered from the imposition of legal and cultural norms that do not reflect their identity or culture.”\textsuperscript{512} Addressing the disenrollment crisis according to a tribe’s own indigenous culture, history, and traditions provides a means for tribal governments to once again be governed in a way that echoes its identity and culture. Second, by taking the reigns and solving the disenrollment epidemic by themselves, tribal governments show that they are indeed responsible sovereigns—sovereigns that respect human rights and do not need federal oversight or intervention. This is true tribal sovereignty.\textsuperscript{513}

2. Litigation

Litigation might bring about an end to the disenrollment crisis. What many commentators on the \textit{Santa Clara Pueblo/Poodry} line of cases overlook is that the authority to disenroll is arguably not even an “aspect[ ] of sovereignty . . . derive[d] from the status of Indian nations as distinct, self-governing entities.”\textsuperscript{514} A “tribe’s right to define its own membership,”\textsuperscript{515} in other words, is not necessarily equivalent to . . .

\textsuperscript{510} Id.

\textsuperscript{511} Id. (“It is unsurprising that a disproportionate number of recent disenrollment cases have arisen in California, where tribes suffered tremendously under the former federal polices of removal and termination . . . . Most of these tribes have historically lacked the financial resources to develop functioning judicial systems. It is interesting to note that many California tribes have recently experienced rapid economic growth as a result of tribe-sponsored gaming, which not only has contributed to assertions of tribal sovereignty but also has provided tribes with the financial resources necessary to establish effective courts.”)

\textsuperscript{512} Painter-Thorne, supra note 126, at 312.


\textsuperscript{514} Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 881 (2d Cir. 1996).

\textsuperscript{515} Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978); see also Reitman, supra note 58, at 851 (“[T]he substantive holding in \textit{Santa Clara} served merely to foreclose a nascent (and in the end, stillborn) federal cause of action for citizenship disputes.”). Disenrollment policies are similar to liquor regulations discussed in \textit{Rice v. Rehner}, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). In \textit{Rice}, the Supreme Court found that the regulation of liquor was never an aspect of “tribal self-government.” \textit{Id.} at 724. Rather, according to the Court, this power was vested solely in the federal government from the time that liquor was introduced to Indian Country. \textit{Id.} at 722–24. The Court waivers on this issue, however. At other points, the Court states that the power to regulate \textit{was} congressionally divested: “There can be no doubt that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area.” \textit{Id.} at 724; see also \textit{id.} at 723 (noting a “congressional divestment of tribal self-government in this area”). In addition, the Court was factually incorrect on this point. See \textsc{Andrew Barr, Drink: A Social History of America} 1 (2002) (noting that “[i]t is not true (as is often supposed) that [tribes] had no alcoholic drinks”).
to a right to sever its relationship with its members. The latter is a federal construct, delegated to tribal governments via assimilation and termination statutes, regulations, and policies. The importance of this delegation is that, while inherent powers are not subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the delegated powers are so limited. This would require, for instance, de novo review in a federal court, the right to representation by an attorney, and access to a representative jury of the disenrollee’s peers.

Despite overwhelming judicial indifference in tribal membership disputes, the proliferation of disenrollment has caused some courts to take interest. Indeed, it appears that some courts are anxious to intervene. In one membership dispute, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California stated that “somebody ought to warn the tribe that this is the kind of facts where some court is going to say ‘we’re outraged’ and put it to them.” In Lewis v. Norton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that a disenrollment dispute was “deeply troubling on the level of fundamental substantive justice.” The Ninth Circuit in Jeffredo v. Macarro expressed frustration that it “did not have jurisdiction to review...
membership decisions, even when the results of such decisions appear unfair.” In *Shenandoah v. Halbritter*, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressed similar frustration that it was unable to adjudicate a membership dispute “[e]ven though the actions of the ruling members of the Nation may be partly inexcusable.” And in *LaMere v. Superior Court of the County of Riverside*, a California Court of Appeals dismissed a disenrollment dispute by noting: “[O]ur ruling means that plaintiffs have no formal judicial remedy for the alleged injustice [because] Congress has not chosen to provide an effective external means of enforcement for the rights of tribal members . . . .” A finding that the power to disenroll is a federally delegated construct—a proposition for which there is ample evidence—would require that the federal government at least provide some rights to those targeted for disenrollment and would thereby satisfy these courts’ concerns.

The downside of such litigation is at least threefold. First, it would add to the list one more inherent limitation on inherent tribal sovereignty. As it stands, the Supreme Court has held that tribes have never possessed the sovereign power to: (1) ally with any country other than the United States; (2) grant land rights to any country other than the United States; (3) exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians; and (4) regulate liquor. Generally, these “ad hoc judicial limitations on tribal authority” are disfavored, as their historical and legal underpinnings are quite suspect, particularly in the absence of direct commands from Congress. Arguing that tribes were implicitly divested of their sovereign authority to disenroll—or, rather, arguing that such a sovereign power never

525. Id. at 921.
526. 366 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2004).
527. Id. at 91.
529. Id. at 1063 n.2.
530. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978); see also generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, *Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation*, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47 (2004). The date of “incorporation” being the operative factor. See id. at 55 (“It was the policies of Congress that resulted in incorporation of tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations,’ and not the policies of Congress after incorporation, that resulted in the implicit divestiture of some of the sovereign tribal powers.”).
existed—at tribes’ incorporation into the United States will likely be met with opposition from tribes on both sides of the debate.

Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 might bar any suit against the federal government.536 Federal courts have consistently held that “plaintiffs cannot get around Santa Clara Pueblo by bringing suit against the government.”537 Instead, courts have held that in any suit against the federal government involving enrollment issues, a tribe is an indispensable party because of its “sovereign interest in membership and in protecting its sovereignty.”538 And because a tribe is immune and cannot be sued, tribal sovereign immunity may bar any suit from moving forward.539 However, there is an argument that in a lawsuit to enjoin the delegation of the power to disenroll—i.e., in determining whether tribes had a “sovereign interest in” disenrollment when they were incorporated into the United States—any interest that a tribe possesses, can be represented by the United States.540

Finally, as a practical note, it should be acknowledged that interpreting the history of federal interactions with tribal governments is not one of the Supreme Court’s strong points.541 Indeed, tribal interests have lost in there 75% of the time—more frequently than convicted felons.542 It is also evident from the Court’s decisions on certiorari that the only Indian law cases that interest the Court are cases where the tribal interest had won below, or in the small number of cases where the federal government consents to Supreme Court review.543 In sum, litigants must be aware that tribal interests at large face an extreme disadvantage in litigating novel issues, such as the one here proposed, in federal court.544

537. Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Arviso v. Norton, 129 F. App’x 391, 394 (9th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2007); Hall v. Babbitt, No. 99-3806, 2000 WL 268485, at *1–2 (8th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000); Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1160 (10th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1996).
538. Painter-Thorne, supra note 126, at 328 (citing Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392, 394).
539. Lewis, 424 F.3d at 962; Arviso, 129 F. App’x at 392.
540. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 150 F. 3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998).
542. Carlson, supra note 493, at 81.
544. Id.
A return to BIA oversight is also an option. It is only recently that the BIA has refused to interfere in disenrollment decisions, and for no apparent reason—citing only a “policy of noninterference” and a “well-established practice under which BIA refrains from interfering in . . . issues concerning tribal membership.”\(^\text{545}\) But this change in direction is just that—a practice and policy that finds no place in law or agency rules or formal policy pronouncements.\(^\text{546}\) Indeed, it appears that this new informal policy actually violates BIA’s formal policy mandating just the opposite. According to a late 1970s\(^\text{547}\) version of the BIA’s Indian Affairs Manual:

> When enrollees lose their membership they also lose their right to share in the distribution of tribal assets. Since the Secretary is responsible for distribution of trust assets to tribal members, disenrollment actions are subject to approval by the Secretary or his authorized representatives . . . Any person whose disenrollment has been approved by the Area Director acting under delegated authority may appeal the adverse decision as provided in 25 C.F.R. § 2.\(^\text{548}\)

Of course, unlike the BIA’s newfound informal policy and practice, “[c]ompliance with the Manual is mandatory for Indian Affairs employees.”\(^\text{549}\) This part of the Indian Affairs Manual has not been modified or superseded, and therefore still constitutes operative and binding BIA policy.\(^\text{550}\) Regardless, even if this section of the Manual was superseded, a simple fix here would be that the BIA, through agency rulemaking, can simply revert to the previous rule, reasserting its authority.

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\(^\text{546}\) As Professor Wilkins explains, “the federal government . . . has reserved to itself the power . . . to overturn or interfere with any tribal nation’s powers including . . . membership decisions when it suits the federal government’s desires to so intervene.” Wilkins, supra note 342.

\(^\text{547}\) U.S. Dep’t of the Interior - Indian Affairs, supra note 182.


\(^\text{549}\) OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY - INDIAN AFFAIRS, DIRECTIVES MANAGEMENT: INDIAN AFFAIRS DIRECTIVES HANDBOOK 7 (2014). Notably, a federal cause of action will arise under the Administrative Procedure Act if the BIA does not comply with the Manual. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); see also Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Nation v. Holder, No. 11-3028, 2011 WL 5835137, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2011) (citing Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“The internal policies that can bind an agency and give rise to a cause of action under the APA are not limited to only those rules promulgated pursuant to notice and comment rule making.”). See also generally Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 49, 78–88 (2005).

\(^\text{550}\) See Letter from Stan Speaks, Northwest Regional Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Ryan Dreveskracht (Feb. 9, 2015) (confirming that this section of the Manual has not been repealed, withdrawn, or replaced) (on file with authors).
to review disputed disenrollment determinations. Indeed, proficient BIA genealogists and historians could resolve disenrollment disputes with finality. While the BIA has historically bungled Indian affairs, or otherwise done more

551. There may need to be an IBIA jurisdictional fix as well. As drafted, the Indian Affairs Manual grants a right to appeal pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2 (2014). And such appeal is likely necessary in order to exhaust administrative remedies, so that a disenrollee might challenge the BIA’s determination in a federal court. See e.g., Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 463 F. Supp. 2d 964, 970 (D.S.D. 2006) (“Plaintiff did not appeal the BIA’s decision to the Regional Director, which is in turn subject to review by the IBIA . . . . The jurisdictional requirement that the Court can only review final agency actions is clear. As a result, plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal because of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”). To be more precise, the determination itself would not be reviewed. Rather, a federal court would be limited to reviewing the BIA’s actions under APA standards; meaning that it may not go beyond a procedural review to reach the merits of the dispute. Feezor v. Babbitt, 953 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1983)). But in 1989 the DOI arguably removed the IBIA’s authority to make such a determination. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1(1)(a)(1) (2014) (“[The] Board of Indian Appeals . . . decides finally for the Department appeals to the head of the Department pertaining to . . . [a]dministrative actions of officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, issued under 25 CFR Chapter I, except as limited in . . . § 4.330 of this part . . . .”); 43 C.F.R. § 4.330(b)(1) (“Except as otherwise permitted by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs or the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by special delegation or request, the Board shall not adjudicate . . . [t]ribal enrollment disputes.”). The IBIA’s previous rules contained no such limitation and, in fact, mandated that the IBIA make these determinations in some instances. See Hearings and Appeals Procedures, 36 Fed. Reg. 7,185, 7,193 (Apr. 15, 1971) (“In cases where the right and duty of the Government to hold property in trust depends thereon, Examiners shall determine . . . the Indian or non-Indian status of heirs or devisees . . . .”). There has generally been no explanation for the change in IBIA procedure. During the rulemaking period one commenter “suggested that the provisions regarding treatment of discretionary decisions in § 4.337(b) should be dropped and the Board given full authority to review such decisions,” to which the Interior Department simply responded that “[t]he Board is not the only appeals board within the Office of Hearings and Appeals limited in its review of discretionary decisions. . . . The comments are, accordingly, not accepted.” Department Hearings and Appeals Procedures, 54 Fed. Reg. 6,483, 6,483 (Feb. 10, 1989). Of course, it may also be argued that the Indian Affairs Manual’s mandated appeal procedure constitutes an appeal “otherwise permitted by the Secretary.” 43 C.F.R. § 4.330(b)(1).


553. To illustrate, a BIA Pacific Region deputy director once barbed to the New York Times that: “The tribe has historically had the ability to remove people . . . Tolerance is a European thing brought to the country. We never tolerated things. We turned our back on people.” Dao, supra note 30. That statement ignores traditional tribal kinship practices, DeMallie, supra note 55, and the reality that removal of Indians from rolls is a federal construct, not one inherent to tribal communities. This BIA comment has been criticized by indigenous legal scholars. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, On Tribal Disenrollment and ‘Tolerance,’ TURTLE TALK (Dec. 13, 2011), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/12/13/on-tribal-disenrollments-and-tolerance/ (“Most tribes . . . are not intolerant. . . . Indian people were not intolerant before the Europeans came . . . .”); id. (“Some Indian tribes tolerated multiple sexual orientations, criminal ‘deviance,’ religion, and intermarriage.”).
harm than good to tribal people—including in the disenrollment arena, as the Colville disenrollment situation highlights—at least BIA administrative review of tribal disenrollment decisions would allow for some form of redress to disenrollees.

4. Indian Civil Rights Act Amendment

Another proposed solution is to amend the ICRA to allow for review of tribal court disenrollment litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants federal courts with original subject matter jurisdiction over certain causes of action and grounds the majority of civil actions heard in federal court. Indeed, such amendment is required by the federal trust obligation to protect “the fundamental rights of political liberty” owed to individual Indians. Disenrollment disputes even cause some members to suffer physical violence at the hands of their governments. These are the exact harms that the ICRA intended to prevent. In short, the ICRA is not working—in the disenrollment context at least.

One criticism that might be raised is that ICRA review is purely procedural and therefore cannot be used to prevent malicious or otherwise wrongful disenrollment. As it stands, a large number of tribal governments lack


555. Smith, supra note 16, at 53 n.88 (“Congress’s plenary authority with respect to Indian affairs would enable Congress to amend ICRA to provide, for instance, a private right of action under the ICRA that would allow aggrieved tribal members to more easily sue in federal court without having to clear the hurdles imposed by Section 1303’s habeas corpus requirement.”). On 28 U.S.C. § 1331 generally, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 265–363 (6th ed. 2011).

556. St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1413 (D. Minn. 1983) (quotation omitted); see also Reitman, supra note 58, at 863 (“[F]ederally recognized tribes are sovereign political entities and . . . the federal government is charged with their protection. Inasmuch as federal permissiveness towards abuses of the citizenship power threatens that sovereignty, the federal government has a responsibility to act.”).

557. See, e.g., supra notes 390–400 and accompanying text.

558. See Painter-Thorne, supra note 126, at 350 (“Congress' intent in passing ICRA was to secure individual rights of tribal members against overreaching by tribal government.”).

559. Whittlesley & Sullivan, supra note 552 (“While the federal Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ostensibly offers legal protections to the victims of enrollment revocations, the reality is that the law is toothless and is not the vehicle through which individual Indians have gained much of anything in the way of rights protection.”).

560. See Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 977 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“[I]f the court concludes that petitioners were denied their rights to procedural due process in connection with the decisions to disenroll . . . the remedy is not reinstatement, which would interfere with tribal sovereign immunity and internal tribal affairs but, rather, a direction to provide appropriate due process, essentially a re-hearing.”).

561. See Reitman, supra note 58, at 808 (“[N]on-substantive review is most likely a waste of time and is of little benefit to those under its dubious protection.”). Along these lines, if ICRA is being amended to create a cause of action for disenrollment anyway, why not also legislate a de novo review? Politically, this may not be feasible, however.
any federal restraints as to citizenship abuses. Even where formal appeal is made available, “it is often to the same body that promulgated the sanction.” What is more, given that the disenrolling tribal council often has the authority to appoint and dismiss tribal judiciaries, “even the availability of formal appeal to a sympathetic and independent tribal judiciary is no guarantee of an effective intra-tribal remedy.” Moreover, case law from various tribal courts demonstrates that “Indian disenrollments and expulsions are often carried out with little or no recognizable process,” and “even when there is an established process, there is no guarantee that it will be followed in any one case.” In short, procedural ICRA review would likely nip most unjustified disenrollment proceedings in the bud, even without looking to the merits.

Another criticism may be that this amendment would require a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. Doing so is not taken lightly by tribal governments. Nor should it. Tribal immunity provides numerous benefits for tribes, including: the ability to cap damages on lawsuits; the ability to limit remedies to nonmonetary relief; the ability to have certain lawsuits heard only in a local forum; the ability to mandate a different type of dispute resolution (e.g., mediation or arbitration); the ability to protect tribal assets from suits through the limitation of damages; the ability to waive immunity in a limited fashion that fosters commercial development; and the ability to use immunity as leverage in negotiations with state and local governments on multiple fronts, notably gaming and taxation.

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that, “as with virtually every other type of sovereign entity, egregious injuries and civil and human rights violations” may be committed by tribal governments and their agents even against their own members. And these injuries and rights deprivations may affect large groups of persons as well as greater tribal interests. Surely, a limited congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for the purpose of a procedural review strikes the proper balance between these two interests. Similarly, “Congress could also empower the BIA to take a more active

562. Id. at 801.
563. Id. at 797.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 797–98.
567. Indeed, the ICRA was enacted because “[i]n the 1960’s, some Indians complained bitterly that tribal constitutions did not extend human rights far enough and that tribal courts did not provide adequate remedies for violations of human rights by tribal governments.” Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part I of II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 308 (1998).
569. Id.
role with respect to what are now considered internal and unreviewable [disenrollment] decisions of tribes.”570 In 2000, Congress intervened to resolve a tribal membership dispute vis-à-vis statutory changes regarding the BIA’s authority to review tribal constitutions.571

A recent study by Professor Kirsten Carlson confirms that “Indian nations garner more attention” than other interest groups “as Congress tries to figure out what to do with them because they do not fit well into the existing structure of U.S. federalism.”572 So notwithstanding current partisan gridlock on Capitol Hill and the political clout of those tribal governments that disenroll their own people, the congressional route for redressing disenrollment is not one that should be foreclosed.573

More generally, tribes should worry that the current Congress might use the nationwide fever pitch of disenrollment controversy as an excuse to end federal self-determination policy, to constrict or terminate Indian Self-Determination Education Assistance Act funding.574 Indeed, Co-Directors of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt have cited a Republican-fueled “trend away from the Indian self-government movement” and predicted that a Republican-controlled Congress might well put “an end to policies of self-determination.”575 Hopefully disenrollment does not give Congress a reason to such harm to all tribal governments,576 particularly those who are not terminating their own people.577

570. Smith, supra note 16, at 54.
572. Carlson, supra note 493, at 137.
573. Smith, supra note 16 (“The increasing number of banishments and disenrollments within Indian country might give Congress reason to amend ICRA to impose further limitations on Indian tribes.”).
577. Anthony Broadman: Tribal Disenrollment Makes Slade Gorton Proud, INDIANZ (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.indianz.com/News/2014/012907.asp (“By proceeding recklessly with mass disenrollments and standing behind sovereign immunity even as to their
5. Truth and Reconciliation

In this subsection, we propose a Truth Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) as an alternate fix to the disenrollment crisis. A TRC is a quasi-judicial entity established to probe, collect evidence, create a record, and respond to human rights abuses. Generally used as a settlement mechanism, TRCs have specific and well-defined mandates, but their bureaucratic structures are flexible. As a government attempts to rebuild, a TRC’s key concern is the question of power. Government leaders must agree to the transfer of power, and that agreement must be firmly in place before steps toward reconciliation begins. TRCs can adopt a variety of organizational formats, but the overarching goal of a TRC is to publish a final report, which includes a record of crimes and human rights abuses that prompted its formation, transcripts of any proceedings, and recommendations for the government.

Currently, private BIA-funded mediation is the only mode of redress for membership disputes, but it rarely works. A TRC for membership disputes, funded by the federal government and available for tribal governments—or even mandated by tribal or federal law—may offer a solution by allowing the dispute to take place in a public forum that is not muted by the federal government. This way, tribal governments might be held accountable to their membership.

6. The Human Rights Approach

Unless something changes domestically, tribal governments cannot be held accountable in international fora. But this does not mean that tribes cannot hold themselves accountable. Indeed, Attorney Greg Rubio has convincingly argued that own citizens, a handful of tribal governments are threatening the very existence of tribal sovereignty.”).

579. Id.
581. Myers, supra note 578, at 100 n.14 (citing Huyse, supra note 580).
582. Id.
586. But see David L. Carey Miller, National Norms Should Prevail, 8 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON L. & JUSTICE 49, 51 (2002) (“From a lawyer’s point of view, the difficulty with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process is that it involves a suspension of the principle that serious criminal conduct should be prosecuted.”).
“the legitimacy of tribal claims to sovereignty and self-determination may, going forward, depend upon their commitment to protecting these rights for all tribal members.”587 And, in fact, a number of tribes have already bound themselves in this fashion.588 In addition, there are unexplored avenues in international law that provide a means for holding the United States accountable for its failure to provide a remedy to those indigenous persons that have been harmed by their tribal governments.

While many of the rights enumerated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”),589 as endorsed by the United States, are aimed at indigenous peoples as collective groups,590 the UNDRIP also guarantees that indigenous people, as individuals, receive all human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized under international human rights law, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.591 The “international human rights law” that is incorporated into the UNDRIP is derived from a number of arenas and applies in an array of circumstances. While a number of the human rights are applicable only to states or state organs,592 others are

587. Rubio, supra note 423, at 40. According to Mr. Rubio:
It would be an odd sovereignty indeed that would give the sovereign unfettered license to ignore the fundamental tenants of human rights law.
Short of denying the universal nature of the rights protected under international human rights law, the grounds on which [a] tribe would avoid at least nominally committing themselves to assuring those protections for tribal members is difficult to perceive.

588. Reitman, supra note 58, at 888.
589. UNDRIP, supra note 27.
591. UNDRIP, supra note 27, at art. 1.
applicable to non-state and quasi-state actors. Still others are not generally applicable to non-state and quasi-state actors, but require states to take proactive measures to prevent the violation of human rights by non-state and quasi-state actors. The human rights approach may fill the substantive and procedural gaps in the implementation of tribal and federal international human rights obligations.

a. Tribal Obligations as Quasi-State Entities

The UNDRIP recognizes that tribal governments possess “the right to self-determination” in that they must be able to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” In fulfillment of their status as governmental entities with the power to govern their territories and members, American tribal governments are self-governing entities, properly described as “quasi-state entities” or “quasi-state actors.” And although not technically nation–states, American tribal governments, as self-governing entities, possess the attributes that are essential for statehood as defined under international law: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with a nation–state.

An important facet of the realization of self-determination is that tribal self-governance has resulted in “the concomitant governmental capacity to both protect

593. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11) (“[T]he development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States.”).
594. UNDRIP, supra note 27, at art. 1.
595. UNDRIP, supra note 27, at art. 1.
596. Domestically, this right has been recognized for decades as “the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). In addition, the United States, as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), has been obligated to grant all minority groups the right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” since 1992. Art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95–20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173–74 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (as a signatory, the United States is “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”). Tribal self-determination is now considered customary international law, enforceable domestically in the United States. S. James Anaya, The Emergence of Customary International Law Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 12 L. & ANTHRO. 127, 128–29 (2005); Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 109, 116–20 (1999); see also Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 124 (1804) (holding that customary international law enforceable domestically).
and violate human rights. As to the latter, the UNDRIP explicitly creates a duty for tribal governments to respect human rights: “In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected.” In addition, it states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.” In sum, the UNDRIP imposes a duty to respect individual human rights directly upon tribal governments. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People recently made this responsibility clear:

[The] wide affirmation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the Declaration does not only create positive obligations for States, but also bestows important responsibilities upon the rights-holders themselves. . . . In exercising their rights and responsibilities under the [UNDRIP], indigenous peoples themselves should be guided by the normative tenets of the Declaration . . . . The implementation of the Declaration by indigenous peoples may . . . require them to develop or revise their own institutions, traditions or customs through their own decision-making procedures.

The duty to honor human rights is also inherent in a tribe fulfilling its right to self-determination, per customary international law. It is generally recognized that an entity has duties under customary international law if it has “international legal personality.” The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) issued an advisory opinion in 1949 on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United

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599. Boronow, supra note 587, at 1378; see also Singel, supra note 40, at 585 (“[J]ust as with any other government, tribes are also capable of abusing their powers and inflicting harm on individuals . . . . [S]everal tribes have been publicly criticized for allegedly violating human rights.”).
600. UNDRIP, supra note 27, at art. 46(2).
601. Id. at art. 34 (emphasis added).
603. What is more, as discussed below, liability for failure to exercise due diligence in enforcing human rights norms will likely result in the Unites States being held responsible for creating a remedy—which would likely “provide an excuse for Congress to further curtail tribal sovereignty under domestic law.” Boronow, supra note 587, at 1420; see also Ludwick, supra note 34, at 44 (“In order to achieve the goal of self-determination . . . tribal governments must maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the Indian people . . . . Tribal disenrollment that is politically motivated undermines the goal of self-determination by breeding cynicism and discouraging participation in the political process.”).
Nations that acknowledged states are not the only subjects of international law.\footnote{Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178–79 (Apr. 11).} The ICJ found that a non-state actor is also bound by customary international law, defining an “international legal personality” as an entity “capable of possessing international rights and duties” and possessing the “capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.”\footnote{Id. at 179.} Regarding the ICJ’s first factor, indigenous peoples have rights under international law, such as the right to self-determination.\footnote{UNDRIP, supra note 27, at art. 3.} As described above, the UNDRIP expressly places a duty on such tribal governments to respect human rights, a duty that is implicit within the right of self-determination. As to the second factor, tribal governments have brought claims to protect their rights under international law before international bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights\footnote{See, e.g., Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005).} and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.\footnote{See, e.g., Anuak Justice Council v. Ethiopia, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., Comm. No. 299/05 (2006); Bakweri Land Claims Comm. v. Cameroon, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., Comm. No. 260/02 (2004).} The UNDRIP explicitly recognizes the right of tribal governments to “have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties . . .”.\footnote{UNDRIP, supra note 40.}

statehood,” are benefactors of the international indigenous human rights movement and in particular the UNDRIP, and are therefore bound by customary international law to uphold human rights.615

b. Tribal Obligations as Non-State Actors

In addition to being responsible for the adherence to human rights norms as quasi-state actors, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) binds tribal governments as non-state actors. The UDHR recognizes “the inherent dignity of the human person” as an individual, and is “firmly focused on the rights-holders rather than the bearers of the corresponding obligations.”616 For example Article 22 of the UDHR provides:

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.617

The drafting history of the UDHR indicates that Article 22 was intended to be complementary to Article 28, which guarantees that “[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized”—assuring conditions in which the individual human rights of Article 22 can be achieved.618 Importantly, protection of these rights is not only entrusted to the state, but to society as well.619 The UDHR thus imposes an “imperative on society as a whole to secure and deliver those entitlements” enumerated therein.620 In sum, the UDHR is properly regarded as a declaration of pre-existing rights that every person and entity—state, non-state, and quasi-state—must honor.

615. Boronow, supra note 587, at 1416; see also Bruce A. Wagman, Advancing Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Pathway to Power, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 419, 438 (1993) (“By virtue of the trust relationship that was established long ago and is still viable, Indian tribes merit a respect nearly on a par with their trustee. Supreme Court cases continue to . . . confirm[,] that tribes are intra-continental ‘nations.’”).


619. UDHR, supra note 617, at arts. 16, 22.

620. McBeth, supra note 616, at 41.
The absence of an enforcement mechanism in existing international human rights law addressing non-state actors does not preclude the existence of legal duties for those actors. Indeed, even human rights treaty-monitoring bodies strictly limited by the treaties they enforce to address only state parties to the relevant treaties, have recognized that non-state actors have a responsibility for the realization of human rights: “While only States are parties to the [International] Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all members of society—individuals, including health professionals, families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business sector—have responsibilities . . . .”

A reading of the UDHR that would limit the obligation to respect human rights to state actors would necessarily contravene the Declaration.

c. U.S. Obligations—State Organs

The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”) lists circumstances in which an act can be attributed to the state. The Draft Articles states that “[t]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law.” This provision encompasses agencies that are “autonomous and independent of the executive government” if the conduct that the institution performs is a “public function” and the institution is doing so vis-à-vis “public power.” Tribal governments undoubtedly fit this definition in most instances. When tribal governments act in this “public” capacity, the United States has an international obligation to “bear responsibility for tribal human rights violations.” The Draft Articles also stipulates that conduct of a non-state actor can be attributed “if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.”

624. Id., at 33.
625. Cowan, supra note 587, at 31–33.
626. Id. at 33.
Two requirements must be met for attribution to occur. First, the approving state must know of the behavior and know that it would be a violation of human rights if it were undertaken by the state itself. Second, the action must be tacitly adopted by the state. Tacit adoption occurs where the state “factually treats [the] conduct for all purposes as if it were legal.”

As described in more detail below, the United States often retrospectively authorizes the disenrollment actions of tribal governments.

d. U.S. Obligations—Failure to Prevent

In addition to ensuring that “its own instrumentalities do not violate the human rights of its people,” states have the additional responsibility to “take positive steps for the improved realization of human rights” and to “prevent those within its jurisdiction from harming the rights of others.” According to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, a state’s positive obligation to protect human rights “[w]ill only be fully discharged if individuals are protected . . . , not just against violations of . . . rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of . . . rights.”

The obligation to protect can extend to a duty to: regulate; prevent infringements by proscribing such conduct in municipal law and monitoring compliance with such laws; take action to investigate allegations of abuses; punish perpetrators; and provide a remedy for victims. The basis of a finding that a state has violated its obligation to protect human rights when those rights are infringed by the action of another individual, institution, or corporation, “is not its complicity in the non-state conduct, but the failure to protect against it.”

As the U.N. Human Rights Committee explained:

[A] failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.

Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has found states in violation of their obligation to protect human rights where “the domestic law in force at the relevant time . . . made lawful the treatment of which the applicant

627. Draft Articles, supra note 623, at art. 11.
631. McBeth, supra note 616, at 33.
634. General Comment 31, supra note 633, at 8.
complained.”635 A failure to investigate or respond properly to human rights infringements committed by private individuals has been held by international treaty-monitoring bodies to violate the state’s treaty obligation to protect human rights.636 At the domestic level, the state is expected to hold the direct perpetrator responsible for human rights abuses, and the state will be accountable at the international level for a failure to do so, as a breach of its treaty obligations. The Inter-American Court has found likewise.637

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) also demands that signatory states undertake “the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes, . . . to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized” therein.638 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has held states liable for failure to comply with this provision as to non-state actors,639 as have regional human rights institutions.640

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)641 requires that states “ensure that private entities or individuals, including transnational corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction, do not deprive individuals of their economic, social and cultural rights.”642 It also holds

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637. In the Case of Velasquez-Rodriguez, it was held:
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.


638. ICCPR, supra note 596, at art. 2.


641. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (Dec. 16, 1966); see also id. at pmbl. (“[T]he individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the [ICESCR].”).

states “responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural rights that result from their failure to exercise due diligence in controlling the behavior of such non-state actors.”

The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (“Declaration on Minorities”) also mandates that states “take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs”; to “take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue”; and to “take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory.” The Declaration on Minorities’s obligation requires states to “take measures to create favourable conditions” undoubtedly creates a responsibility to take proactive measures to prevent the violation of human rights by non-state actors.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) requires state parties “to prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.” The CERD further obligates states to assure effective protection from racial discrimination, and to assure the individual’s right to seek damages if it nevertheless occurs. For instance, in L.K. v. The Netherlands, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination held that these norms require the state to take concrete action when confronted with private racial discrimination. In L.K., a group of street residents made clear that they did not want foreigners to move into the neighborhood, and filed a petition against the landlord to prevent him from renting the home to a


643. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 642, at 18 n. 37; see also id. at art. II p. 6 (“The obligation to protect requires States to prevent violations of such rights by third parties . . . The obligation to fulfill requires States to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such rights.”).


645. Id. at art. 4, §§ 2–4.


foreigner. The Committee held that the state violated the CERD by failing to offer effective protections and remedies. The American Convention on Human Rights contains an undertaking to “respect” and to “ensure” the human rights contained therein. The latter phrase gives rise to protective duties, a fact that the Inter-American Commission recognized as early as 1975.

The UNDRIP explicitly requires that “[s]tates, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration,” including the securing of individual rights discussed in the UNDRIP and incorporated vis-à-vis Article 1. This includes steps to ensure that non-state actors do not violate individual rights.

7. Intra/Intertribal Disenrollment Appellate Court

Professor Suzianne Painter-Thorne has proposed the creation of “wholly independent judicial bodies such as an intertribal appellate court that would provide independent review of tribal membership decisions.” Specifically, argues Painter-Thorne, such a tribunal would “provide redress for those aggrieved by enrollment decisions, quieting critics’ cries for federal oversight.” Ideally, an intertribal appellate court would administer appeals from trial courts of numerous tribes, much like the United States Courts of Appeal review appeals from federal district courts. Ideally, the courts would be operated by the tribes themselves, in order to provide “a level of judicial independence in the review of membership decisions that critics charge is currently lacking under the current structure of tribal governments and court systems.”

One criticism of this approach is that it would require tribes to waive their sovereign immunity in an alien tribunal, potentially opening up a Pandora’s box of

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648. Id.
652. UNDRIP, supra note 27, at art. 38.
654. Id.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 347.
liability. But in this situation the benefit surely outweighs the cost, as tribes who assert sovereign immunity in the face of disenrollment actions put the entire doctrine at risk. For instance, in *Lewis v. Norton*, the Ninth Circuit found that the underlying membership dispute was “deeply troubling on the level of fundamental substantive justice” and urged that Congress completely abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in light of the “new and economically valuable premium on tribal membership.” Tribal members themselves urge such a waiver, and have in fact called on Congress to waive tribal sovereign immunity in federal courts—and, in the past, Congress has seriously considered doing so. As noted by Professor Patrice Kunesh:

[T]ribes should be mindful that improvident use of tribal sovereign immunity may impede actualization of full tribal self-determination and obstruct ultimate tribal vindication of important legal rights... Co-extensive with the expansive exercise of sovereign powers, and arguably to the judicial viability of tribal sovereign immunity, is the necessity of ensuring that such power is exercised with a good measure of political fairness, responsiveness and transparency... Thus, tribal immunity is much more than a protection of the legitimate interests of tribes; it is a privilege that carries with it the responsibility to engage in fair dealing in all transactions, in governmental and commercial activities and with tribal members and nonmembers alike, and to provide an independent forum properly authorized and equipped to provide appropriate and adequate relief to those who interact with tribes and are injured by them.

In sum, a very limited waiver of sovereign immunity as it relates to disenrollment and the protection of individual human rights would sacrifice very little, and would protect a whole lot—it will ensure procedural and substantive fairness without causing Congress or the Supreme Court to trample tribal sovereignty.

**CONCLUSION**

Federal assimilation and termination policies of yesteryear have effectively eroded the right of tribal governments to make enrollment decisions “distinct from

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658. 424 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2005).

659. *Id.* at 963.


663. *See* Painter-Thorne, *supra* note 126, at 350 (“To the extent membership disputes are viewed as running afoul of individual rights, the risk of congressional intervention is very real and would cost much in terms of sovereignty.”).
the nation—states that threaten to engulf them.”\textsuperscript{664} The result is that the concepts and assumptions of American Indian identity reproduce the very social inequalities that have traditionally defined American Indian oppression.\textsuperscript{665} Until these ideologies are disrupted by American indigenous peoples and tribal governments themselves, “the important projects for native decolonization and self-determination that define Native movements and cultural revitalization efforts today are impossible.”\textsuperscript{666}

Unless tribal governments address the disenrollment crisis in the first instance—either from internal reform or in support of minimally evasive federal policy or legislation changes—American indigenous peoples could end up terminating themselves. Indeed, as National Geographic photojournalist Aaron Huey poignantly remarked in a TED Talk after a visit to Sioux Indian country:

> The last chapter in any successful genocide is the one in which the oppressor can remove their hands and say, ‘My God, what are these people doing to themselves? They’re killing each other. They’re killing themselves while we watch them die.’ This is how we came to own these United States. This is the legacy of manifest destiny.\textsuperscript{667}

\textit{This is Indian disenrollment.}

Yet the modern American legacy is not, or should not be, one of Manifest Destiny. Every U.S. President for the last half century, as well as Congress on many occasions throughout that span, has renounced that legacy, in recognition of the indelible mark of American indigenous peoples on American history, geography, culture, and society.\textsuperscript{668} The modern American legacy must instead honor and cherish American indigenous peoples, as an embodiment of Americana. But unless we the people—meaning American indigenous peoples first and foremost; the federal government, and the individuals who comprise its executive, legislative and judicial branches; other governmental and non-governmental entities; and the American citizenry at large—collectively do something to find a cure to the disenrollment epidemic, America’s indigenous peoples may cease to exist.

We must find the cure.


\textsuperscript{665} Barker, supra note 22, at 7.

\textsuperscript{666} Id.
